Opinion · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Raschel v. Rish
110 A.D.2d 1067
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Date
- 1985-04-05
- Topic
- litigation
How later courts describe this case
- “Although Dr. Rish was a part owner of defendant private proprietary hospital and served as president of its board of directors and as chief of plastic surgery, there is no evidence that he was an agent or employee of the hospital.”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Raschel v. Rish. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Authority status
- pending
- Cited by
- 27 opinions
RASCHEL v. RISH,110 A.D.2d 1067[4th Dept 1985]
ANNA RASCHEL, Also Known as ANNA M. RASCHEL, Respondent, v. BENITO RISH,
Defendant, and YONKERS PROFESSIONAL HOSPITAL, Appellant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department.
April 5, 1985
The derivative claim is dismissed. The undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff engaged Dr. Rish as her physician and paid him directly for his services and that she consulted with him at his private office where the alleged silicone injections were administered. Although Dr. Rish was a part owner of defendant private proprietary hospital and served as president of its board of directors and as chief of plastic surgery, there is no evidence that he was an agent or employee of the hospital. A physician's involvement as a director or stockholder of a hospital does not supply any inference that the hospital controlled or supervised his private practice plaintiff failed to submit any other proof that Dr. Rish was the actual or apparent agent of the hospital, hence, under the circumstances here, the hospitalPage 1068cannot be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior (Fiorentino v. Wenger,19 N.Y.2d 407;Smith vFerro,86 A.D.2d 752).
Further, the record does not establish that the hospital failed to furnish skillful care or that it assumed the obligation to obtain plaintiff's informed consent and partial summary judgment is directed in favor of the hospital (CPLR3212[e]). In our view, however, plaintiff has established the existence of issues of fact relating to the hospital's breach of its duty to investigate Dr. Rish's competency before renewing his staff privileges. While a hospital is not responsible for the actual treatment of a patient by a private physician with staff privileges, the failure of a hospital to develop and adhere to reasonable procedures for reviewing a physician's qualifications creates a foreseeable risk of harm thus establishing an independent duty to such patients (Bowhall v. Hanlon,99 A.D.2d 857;Elam v. College Park Hosp.,132 Cal.App.3d 332,183 Cal.Rptr. 156;Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp.,99 Wis.2d 708;see also, Fiorentino v. Wenger,19 N.Y.2d 407,supra; Byorkv. Carmer,109 A.D.2d 1087). To counter the hospital's contention that it had followed reasonable credentials procedures in reviewing Dr. Rish's qualifications, plaintiff established that Dr. Rish had been sued at least three times for malpractice for surgery performed in 1973 and 1974 and for silicone injections in 1972. Thus, whether the hospital negligently failed to restrict Dr. Rish's staff privileges is a question of fact which should be determined at trial. Accordingly, defendant hospital is entitled to judgment dismissing (1) plaintiff's derivative cause of action and (2) part of her cause of action which claims that the hospital is liable for its own negligence.
Present — Dillon, P.J., Boomer, Green, O'Donnell and Schnepp, JJ.