Opinion · Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Maplecrest Sausage Co. v. Tully
67 A.D.2d 329
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- Jurisdiction
- New York
- Date
- 1979-04-19
- Topic
- general
OPINION OF THE COURT Mahoney, P. J. Initially, petitioner contends that respondent was barred from assessing sales and use taxes for the taxable period March 1, 1972 through August 31, 1972 by subdivision (b) of section 1147 of the Tax Law which prohibits the assessment of additional tax after the expiration of more than three years from the date of the filing of a return. On September 4, 1975 petitioner signed an agreement extending the period of limitations to December 20, 1975, and on November 14, 1975 a "Consent to Fixing of Tax Not Previously Determined and Assessed” was signed by petitioner subject to a letter in which petitioner protested the amount of the taxes due listed in the consent form and requested a hearing. A "Notice of Determi*331nation and Demand for Payment of Sales and Use Taxes Due”, dated December 18, 1975, was sent to petitioner, listing the tax due (identical to that listed in the consent form mentioned above) together with penalty and interest.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Maplecrest Sausage Co. v. Tully. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 5 opinions
OPINION OF THE COURT
Mahoney, P. J.Initially, petitioner contends that respondent was barred from assessing sales and use taxes for the taxable period March 1, 1972 through August 31, 1972 by subdivision (b) of section 1147 of the Tax Law which prohibits the assessment of additional tax after the expiration of more than three years from the date of the filing of a return. On September 4, 1975 petitioner signed an agreement extending the period of limitations to December 20, 1975, and on November 14, 1975 a "Consent to Fixing of Tax Not Previously Determined and Assessed” was signed by petitioner subject to a letter in which petitioner protested the amount of the taxes due listed in the consent form and requested a hearing. A "Notice of Determi
Next, petitioner contends that its purchase of disposable artificial casings used in forming its products is exempt from sales and use tax pursuant to section 1115 (subd [a], par [19]) and subdivision (4) of section 1118 of the Tax Law. Petitioner concedes that with respect to the hot dogs which it manufactures, the casings are removed from the finished product and disposed of prior to their shipment for retail sale. Accordingly, the commission was amply justified in concluding that the casings did not constitute cartons, containers and wrapping and packing material "actually transferred by the vendor to the purchaser” (Tax Law, § 1115, subd [a], par [19]; emphasis added), or "property which is converted into or becomes a component part of a product produced for sale by the purchaser” (Tax Law, § 1118, subd [4]). These exemptions will generally be construed against a taxpayer unless it would defeat the settled purpose of the statute (Matter of G & B Pub. Co. v Department of Taxation & Fin., Sales Tax Bur., 57 AD2d 18, 21), and, accordingly, we reject petitioner’s argument.
We also reject petitioner’s contention that this State lacks the power to impose a sales and use tax on the lease of a truck owned by one of its employees which is used exclusively for the transportation of petitioner’s products to and from its processing plant located in New York. The record establishes that the truck is used solely for petitioner’s benefit and is subject to its direction and control. Furthermore, the truck travels at least 300 miles per week on New York roads and
The determination should be confirmed, and the petition dismissed, without costs.
Greenblott, Staley, Jr., Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs.