Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

California v. Zook

Cal. v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1949-05-02
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • “[S]ometimes [an officer’s] authority to arrest a suspect is based on facts known only to his superiors or associates.”
  • federal regulation of travel bureaus did not preempt consistent state regulation of same subject
  • ". . . normally congressional purpose to displace local laws must clearly be manifested"
  • “[W]hether Congress has or has not expressed itself, the 4 1 fundamental inquiry, broadly stated, is the same: does the State action conflict 2 with national policy?”
  • “[T]he State may punish . . . for the safety and welfare of its inhabitants; the nation may punish for the safety and welfare of interstate commerce. There is no conflict.”
  • information casting doubt on identity relevant to the determination of reasonableness
  • upholding state prohibition of transportation not licensed by ICC

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed California v. Zook. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
181 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause A state statute prohibiting persons from selling or arranging transportation over the state's public highways by carriers lacking an Interstate Commerce Commission permit is not invalid under the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, even as applied to a travel bureau arranging "share-expense" passenger transportation in private automobiles across state lines. 336 U.S. 726, 726-738
  2. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause The mere fact that a state law affecting interstate commerce is identical to a federal law on the same subject does not automatically invalidate the state law; the question is resolved by judgment upon the particular case — whether the state law conflicts with national policy and whether Congress intended to make its jurisdiction exclusive. 336 U.S. at 728-731
  3. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause A congressional purpose to displace local laws must normally be clearly manifested; where displacement is claimed on the ground of conflict in terms, it must clearly appear that the federal provisions are inconsistent with the state provisions. 336 U.S. at 733
  4. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause The tradition of the states' "usual police powers" aids in determining congressional intent as to the exclusion of state action on interstate commerce, at least where Congress has legislated, and the states clearly have an interest in regulating the use of their own highways. 336 U.S. at 734-735
  5. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause No conflict in terms exists, nor is any possible, between a state statute and a substantially identical federal statute where the state statute makes the federal law the law of the state on the matter. 336 U.S. at 735
  6. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause Congress's adoption of a federal statute in a field where little state legislation existed when Congress acted does not indicate an intent to substitute a uniform federal rule for diverse state laws, for there is no intent to displace laws with no existing laws to displace. 336 U.S. at 735-736
  7. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause A state statute otherwise valid is not rendered invalid by the fact that it imposes heavier penalties than the corresponding federal act, or by the possibility of double punishment. 336 U.S. at 731-738
  8. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause Difficulties confronting state regulation of other phases of interstate commerce do not justify excluding state regulation of the sale or arrangement of interstate motor carrier transportation where the state statute makes federal law its own and does not conflict with Interstate Commerce Commission policy. 336 U.S. at 736
  9. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause The validity of a state statute that does not conflict with Interstate Commerce Commission policy is unaffected by an earlier state statute that did conflict with that policy. 336 U.S. at 737
  10. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause As to casual, occasional, or reciprocal transportation of passengers for hire, the state may punish for the safety and welfare of its inhabitants, and the federal government may punish for the safety and welfare of interstate commerce. 336 U.S. at 738
  11. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause Absent congressional action, the validity of state regulation of interstate commerce turns on whether the state interest is outweighed by a national interest in the unhampered operation of interstate commerce; state action is struck down if the activity demands a uniform national rule and sustained if it is of predominantly local interest. Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
  12. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause Congress may redefine the areas of local and national predominance over interstate commerce, notwithstanding theoretical inconsistency with the rationale of the Commerce Clause as a limitation in its own right, and the Court in doubtful cases seeks to discover the extent to which Congress intended to exercise that power, employing presumptions grounded in experience. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769
  13. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause Whether or not Congress has expressed itself, the fundamental inquiry in determining whether state regulation of interstate commerce is displaced is whether the state action conflicts with national policy; the Cooley rule, the question of congressional occupation of the field, and the search for conflict in the terms of state and federal statutes are separate particularizations of that single principle. Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
  14. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause The proposition that when Congress has taken a particular subject matter in hand "coincidence is as ineffective as opposition" is not an independent rule but an application of the principle that state action may not conflict with national policy, and it presupposes that Congress has taken the subject matter in hand to the exclusion of state laws rather than operating as a mechanical rule regardless of other circumstances indicating congressional intent. Charleston W.C.R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604; Missouri P.R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 157-159
  15. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause Identity between state and federal law does not establish the automatic invalidity of the state measure; coincidence of regulation is only one factor, though an important one that may persuasively indicate a congressional intent to exclude state laws, and a state law is not to be declared a help merely because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go. Varnville, 237 U.S. at 604; Pennsylvania Railroad, 250 U.S. at 569
  16. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause Whether Congress and its commissions have so far exercised the exclusive jurisdiction belonging to Congress as to exclude the states must be answered by a judgment upon the particular case; statements concerning Congress's "exclusive jurisdiction" beg the question whether Congress intended to make its jurisdiction exclusive. Pennsylvania Railroad, 250 U.S. at 569; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410
  17. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Concurrent State and Federal Power The same act may, as to its character and tendencies and the consequences it involves, constitute an offense against both the state and federal governments and may draw to its commission the penalties denounced by either, as appropriate to its character in reference to each. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, 569; United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 384
  18. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause A state law that conflicts with federal law must yield, but a state law that recognizes the supremacy of the national law and conforms to it may be enforced. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 258
  19. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause Before a federal statute will be construed to override state laws, Congress must clearly manifest an intent to displace them; where conflict in terms is claimed, it must be clear that the federal provisions are inconsistent with the state provisions to justify thwarting state regulation. H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. at 156
  20. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause General propositions derived from the Commerce Clause are only persuasive indications of congressional intent, and the Commerce Clause question in a particular case can be resolved only by careful scrutiny of the particular activity regulated.
  21. Constitutional Law — Fourteenth Amendment — Scope of State Police Powers The states are no longer limited to their "traditional" police powers in considering a statute's validity under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
  22. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause State regulation of the sale or arrangement of motor carrier transportation on the state's highways is allowable state action when Congress has not acted, and protection against fraud and physical harm to a state's residents falls within the oldest ambit of the police power; a state's interest in its own highways has been given more weight than the national interest against burdening commerce. California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109
  23. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause The removal of the Motor Carrier Act's exemption for casual, occasional, or reciprocal transportation does not render invalid a state statute that makes federal law its own and presents no conflict in terms, and a contrary result would not follow merely because the Interstate Commerce Commission issued its order after the decision in California v. Thompson, since specificity would be expected if the agency intended to supersede state laws. 336 U.S. at 735-738
  24. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause A congressional intention to displace state laws cannot be found when no state laws existed to displace at the time Congress acted; a striking absence of state law in states where the Interstate Commerce Commission recognized the problem as serious demonstrates a purpose to fill a void rather than to nationalize a single rule. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U.S. 439
  25. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause The Interstate Commerce Commission is presumed not to have intended to deprive itself of effective aid from local officers experienced in enforcement, particularly given the Commission's small staff. 61st Annual Report of the I.C.C. (1947), p. 122; 62d Annual Report of the I.C.C. (1948), p. 109
  26. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause State and federal regulations of interstate commerce may have separate spheres of operation, and the exclusion of state laws is determined by examining the whole case rather than by normal congressional intent alone. Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. at 208
  27. Civil Procedure — Appellate Review — Finality of State Court Judgment No further review lies in the state courts from a judgment of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Art. VI, §§ 4, 4b, Calif. Const.; People v. Reed, 13 Cal.App.2d 39, 56 P.2d 240
  28. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause A federal statute providing that nothing in it shall be construed to authorize a motor carrier to do an intrastate business on the highways of any state, or to interfere with the exclusive exercise by each state of the power of regulation of intrastate commerce by motor carriers on the highways thereof, expresses deference to state action on intrastate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 302(b); 79 Cong. Rec. 5735-5737
  29. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause As to the business of arranging for motor carrier transportation beyond state lines, Congress's power to regulate commerce "among the several States" is an excluding, not an exclusive, power; state action is not barred by the Commerce Clause itself but only by appropriate congressional action, and state action is displaced only to the extent Congress chooses to displace it. California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109
  30. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause The validity of state statutes prohibiting or regulating acts committed in the course of interstate commerce, in a field where Congress has taken no action, presents a question distinct from that raised where a state seeks to punish additionally a transaction in interstate commerce over which Congress has actively exercised substantially conflicting federal jurisdiction.
  31. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause Once Congress has lawfully exercised its legislative supremacy in one of its allotted fields without indicating consent to share it with the states, the burden of overcoming the supremacy of federal law in that field is upon any state seeking to do so.
  32. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Exclusive Jurisdiction Where one government has exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter, and therefore the exclusive power to punish, the principle that an offender may be prosecuted in two jurisdictions for one act does not apply. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439, 446
  33. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause The commerce power, when exercised by Congress, is exclusive and ipso facto supersedes existing state legislation on the same subject, and the test is not whether state legislation conflicts with the details of the federal law or supplements it, but whether the state had any jurisdiction over a subject over which Congress had exerted its exclusive control. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346
  34. Criminal Law & Procedure — Multiple Punishment — Overlapping Federal and State Jurisdiction There is a general policy against subjecting a person to punishment more than once for the commission of a single act, and the unfairness to the individual and cumbersomeness for enforcement purposes of double punishment suggest it should not be read into legislation absent clear language demonstrating a purpose to permit it, though the Double Jeopardy Clause does not itself bar a federal prosecution following a state conviction for the same acts. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105
  35. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause Where Congress intends to share the exclusivity of its jurisdiction with the states, appropriate language can make that intent clear, and examples of such express provision include the Eighteenth Amendment's concurrent-power clause, the Migratory Bird Conservation Act's provision for state enforcement upon certification, and the Whaling Treaty Act's provision preserving state laws not inconsistent with the Convention. U.S. Const.; 16 U.S.C. § 715p; 16 U.S.C. § 912
  36. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause A federal statute that temporarily and conditionally exempts a class of interstate transportation from federal regulation, subject to administrative removal of the exemption, creates a special situation in which state regulation continues only until the exemption is terminated, and termination of the exemption by the agency's order substitutes federal for state control rather than permitting joint or duplicating federal and state control. Ex parte No. MC-35, 33 M.C.C. 69; 49 C.F.R. Cum. Supp. § 210.1
  37. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause The fundamental issue in determining whether state regulation is displaced is whether Congress consented to sharing its exclusive jurisdiction, not the identity, similarity, diversity, or repugnance of the state and federal statutes; the degree of actual or potential conflict is materially related to that issue, so that clear conflict would be practically conclusive against the state, while complete absence of conflict resulting in mere duplication would not necessarily establish congressional consent.
  38. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause Effective integration of federal and state jurisdictions is achieved when each is given exclusive control over designated activities, rather than simultaneous, dual, and conflicting control over the same activities; the inherent objectionability of double punishment for a single act and the difficulties inherent in diverse legislative and enforcement policies argue against introducing new state offenses, as distinguished from state cooperation in prosecuting existing federal offenses.
  39. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause A federal statute conditionally exempting casual, occasional, or reciprocal interstate transportation of passengers by motor vehicle for compensation from federal regulation also exempts from federal brokerage license requirements the travel bureaus that sell or arrange for such unlicensed and unregulated transportation. 49 Stat. 545-546; 49 Stat. 546
  40. Administrative Law — Motor Carrier Broker Licensing A travel bureau that arranges motor transportation of persons in interstate commerce and sells tickets on commission for licensed motor carriers is required to obtain a broker's license under the Motor Carrier Act; the Commission may condition the license on the applicant's discontinuance of arranging transportation by unlicensed carriers found not in the public interest, and arranging for prospective passengers to enter into compensated interstate transportation arrangements with private individuals, rather than motor carriers, is not in the public interest. Frank Broker Application, 8 M.C.C. 15
  41. Administrative Law — Removal of Statutory Exemption The Interstate Commerce Commission, upon finding it necessary to carry out the National Transportation Policy, removed the statutory exemption for casual, occasional, or reciprocal interstate passenger transportation to the extent necessary to make all provisions of the Act applicable where such transportation is sold, offered for sale, provided, furnished, contracted for, or arranged for by any person for compensation or as a regular occupation or business. Ex parte No. MC-35; Sec. 203(b)(9), 49 Stat. 546, 54 Stat. 919, 921; 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(9)
  42. Administrative Law — Validity and Effective Date of Agency Order An Interstate Commerce Commission order removing a statutory exemption becomes effective on its stated date, and notice of the order is given to the affected public by publication in the Federal Register and by depositing copies in the office of the Secretary of the Commission. Ex parte No. MC-35 order
  43. Statutory Interpretation — Separability Clauses A statutory provision for separability of any section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase held unconstitutional does not save the remainder of the statute if the invalid part is inseparable in operation. 1933 Cal. Stat., c. 390, p. 1013
  44. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause Where Congress has taken exclusive jurisdiction over conduct and has not consented to share its jurisdiction with the states, a conviction under a state statute punishing the same conduct is invalid, and the federal statute's express distinction between powers of taxation and powers of regulation supports the conclusion that regulation of the interstate commerce in question was vested exclusively in the Interstate Commerce Commission. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 617-618; Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439
  45. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause When Congress has taken a particular subject matter in hand, state law coincidence with federal law is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go; where federal regulation has taken over conduct theretofore left to state regulation, superimposing the consciously displaced state regulation upon the displacing federal regulation is improper. Charleston W. Car. R. Co. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538
  46. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause A substantial conflict between the sanctions available under a state statute and those available under a federal statute is not conclusive, but is entitled to consideration as indicating the absence, rather than the presence, of implied consent by the United States to state intrusion into exclusive federal jurisdiction created by the Federal Constitution, and congressional consent to state legislation that makes an expressly stated congressional maximum penalty no longer a maximum cannot readily be assumed. 49 Stat. 564, 49 U.S.C. § 322(a); Cal. Pen. Code § 654.3