Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Atherton Mills v. Johnston

259 U.S. 13

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1922-05-15
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • suit contesting the validity of a child labor statute mooted when plaintiff-child was “[no longer] within the ages affected by the act”
  • suit to prevent discharge of minor under statute regulating work by minors becomes moot when plaintiff reaches majority
  • constitutional challenge to Child Labor Tax Act which applied to businesses employing children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen was moot where plaintiff was no longer within the ages covered by the Act

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Atherton Mills v. Johnston. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
57 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Mootness Where, pending appeal, a minor plaintiff has reached an age no longer covered by the statute whose application was the subject of the suit, so that the act can no longer affect him, the case for an injunction has become moot. 259 U.S. at 15
  2. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Mootness When a case has become moot, the appellate court cannot consider its merits; it must reverse the decree below with direction to dismiss the bill without costs to either party. 259 U.S. at 15
ATHERTON MILLSv. JOHNSTON,259 U.S. 13(1922)
42 S.Ct. 422
ATHERTON MILLSv. JOHNSTON ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF NORTH CAROLINA.
No. 16.
Argued December 10, 1919; restored to docket for reargument June 6, 1921;
reargued March 7, 8, 1922.
Decided May 15, 1922.
A father and minor son secured a permanent injunction preventing a manufacturer from discharging the son from employment in consequence of the Federal Child Labor Tax Law, upon the ground that the law was unconstitutional; but, pending an appeal, the son ceased to be within the ages affected by the statute.Held, that, as the case had become moot, the merits could not be considered, but the decree should be reversed with direction to dismiss the bill without costs. P. 15. Reversed.
APPEAL from a decree of the District Court granting a
permanent injunction. SeeChild Labor Tax Case, post, 20.
Mr. Solicitor General Beck, with whomMr. Robert P. Reederwas on the brief, for the United States, asamici curiae.1Mr. William P. BynumandMr. W.M. Hendren, with whomMr.Clement ManlyandMr. Junius Parkerwere on the briefs, for appellees.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the court.
The two Johnstons, father and son, citizens of North Carolina, the former in his own right, and as the authorizedPage 14next friend of his son, filed their bill of complaint April 15, 1919, against the Atherton Mills, a corporation of the same State. The bill averred that Johnston, the son, was a minor between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years, that Johnston, the father, supporting his son, was entitled to his earnings until he attained his majority, that the son was in the employ of the defendant, that by the terms of the so-called Child Labor Tax Act, approved February 24, 1919, c. 18, § 1200,40 Stat. 1057, 1138, the defendant was subjected to a tax of one-tenth of its annual profits if it employed a child within the ages of fourteen and sixteen for more than eight hours a day, six days a week, or before the hour of 6 A.M. of after the hour of 7 P.M.; that the defendant was to unwilling to arrange a schedule of working hours to comply with this requirement for the minor complainant, and was about to discharge him because of the act, thus depriving the son and father of all of the son's earnings. On the ground that the act was invalid because beyond the powers of Congress, and that the discharge would injure both complainants by a serious deprivation of earnings, which but for the law they would enjoy, and that the granting of an injunction would prevent a multiplicity of suits, they prayed for an injunction against the defendant from discharging the complainant son or in any manner curtailing his employment to eight hours a day or otherwise. The defendant answered admitting all the substantial averments of the bill except the invalidity of the Child Labor Tax Act. It specifically admitted its intention to discharge the complainant son when the act went into effect and solely because of the act. On April 23, 1919, a motion for a preliminary injunction was heard. The United States Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina, not entering an appearance, but speaking asamicus curiae, suggested "the want of jurisdiction because there is no allegation in the bill of a contract preventing the defendantPage 15from discharging the employee for any reason that might seem fit to it, and also because the case is not one arising under the internal revenue or other federal laws so as to give the court jurisdiction to pass on the validity of the law." The court granted the temporary injunction and made it permanent by order of May 2, 1919.

The defendant appealed directly to this court under § 238 of the Judicial Code, assigning error (1) to the failure to dismiss the bill; (2) to the holding that the Child Labor Tax Act was invalid; (3) to the injunction.

The record shows that the pleadings were framed to bring this case within that ofTruaxv.Raich,239 U.S. 33,38; but it differs from that case in that the sole defendant here is the employer, while in that case there was joined with the employer the state officer who threatened to enforce the alleged invalid law against his codefendant and compel him to end the contract against his will and to the complainant's irreparable damage. The record further raises the doubt whether on its face this is a real case within the meaning of the Constitution upon which the judgment of this court upon the validity of an act of Congress under the Constitution can be invoked, and whether it does not violate the principle and ignore the caution of the words of Mr. Justice Brewer inChicago Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.Wellman,143 U.S. 339,345, which are quoted inMuskratv.UnitedStates,219 U.S. 346,359. These are serious questions requiring full consideration. We only state them in order that it may not be thought by our conclusion that we here decide them.

The lapse of time since the case was heard and decided in the District Court has brought the minor, whose employment was the subject-matter of the suit, to an age which is not within the ages affected by the act. The act, even if valid, can not affect him further. The case for an injunction has, therefore, become moot and we canPage 16not consider it.Millsv.Green,159 U.S. 651;Codlinv.Kohlhausen,181 U.S. 151;Tennesseev.Condon,189 U.S. 64,71;American Book Co. v.Kansas,193 U.S. 49,51;Jonesv.Montague,194 U.S. 147;Fisherv.Baker,203 U.S. 174.

The case having become moot the decree is reversed with a direction to dismiss the bill without costs to either party.Reversed.
  1. Page 13 At the former hearingMr. Solicitor General KingandMr.Assistant Attorney General Friersonargued the case on behalf of the United States, asamici curiae, by special leave of court. No brief was filed for either hearing by the appellant. ↩