Opinion · Supreme Court of North Carolina
State v. . George
State v. . George, 29 N.C. 321 (N.C. 1847)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of North Carolina
- Jurisdiction
- North Carolina
- Date
- 1847-06-05
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- acts and declarations of one criminal conspirator are considered the acts and declarations of all in the sense that they may be received in evidence against all if they were done or uttered in furtherance or in execution of the conspiracy
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UpLaw has not yet analyzed State v. . George. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
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STATEv. GEORGE,29 N.C. 321(1847)
THE STATE v. GEORGE, A SLAVE.
Supreme Court of North Carolina
(June Term, 1847.)
2. But to make the acts or declarations of another evidence against a prisoner, a conspiracy or common design between them must be established.
The prisoner was separately tried upon an indictment in which he was charged as principal and Mary Meadows as accessory before the fact with the murder of James Meadows. In the course of the trial a (322) witness for the State, having been examined as to some other matter, was then interrogated by the solicitor for the State as to the acts and declarations of Mary Meadows tending to show hostility to her husband and an intention to cause some great bodily injury to be inflicted upon him. This was objected to by the prisoner's counsel, but the solicitor stating at the same time that he then intended to call witnessesPage 227to prove a conspiracy between Mary Meadows and the prisoner, it was admitted by the court.
Evidence was then introduced to show a guilty connection between the prisoner and Mary Meadows, which it is not thought necessary to repeat.
In another and subsequent stage of the cause, after a recess and before recommencing the examination of witnesses, the prisoner's counsel, addressing the court, remarked, they supposed it was unnecessary to repeat the objection already made to evidence, to which the court replied, it was deemed unnecessary; that objection would be considered as made to all testimony of the same kind. If they desired, however, to make a point as to the admissibility of other evidence upon other grounds, it ought to be mentioned.
No exception is taken to the instructions given to the jury. There was a rule for a new trial on account of improper testimony. Rule discharged. Judgment and appeal.
But there is another and still more formidable objection to the sustaining of the verdict in this case. The prosecuting officer, when he offered in evidence these acts and declarations of Mary Meadows, (324) was sensible that at that state of the case they were not admissible; to make them so, he declared his intention to prove a conspiracy, and it is to be presumed such a conspiracy as would authorize their introduction. The prisoner was on trial for the murder of James Meadows, and the conspiracy to be proved was one to effect that crime; and so the court must have understood it. Does thecaseshow thatanyconspiracy was proved? It states, "that evidence was then introduced to show a guilty connection, and that it was not thought necessary to go into particulars." It appears that after the introduction of this testimony the court took a recess, and upon resuming the trial the prisoner's counsel renewed his motion, or, rather, informed the court that he had not abandoned it, and the evidence was not withdrawn from the jury. Whatever doubt might rest upon the admissibility of the acts and declarations of Mary Meadows, as proved, coupled with evidence of a conspiracy, to my mind it is perfectly clear that, as the case appears here, they were not admissible. The words "guilty connection" have no definite meaning as descriptive of any particular offense. The combination of a parcel of smugglers is a guilty connection; so to rob, or to commit an assault or battery, or to strike for higher wages, all these are guilty connections, punishable by law. But the words, in common parlance, when applied to a man and woman, mean a carnal connection. If A. charge B., a woman, with having a guilty connection with C., ninety-nine men out of every hundred will understand it as a charge of incontinence on the part of B. And if the words were introduced into a declaration for slander, with proper averments, no jury would hesitate to hold them slanderous. And we are required to hold that these vague expressions show that a conspiracy to murder James Meadows existed between the prisoner and Mary Meadows, for it is the only ground upon which her acts and declarations were, or could be, held admissible. It is precisely as if the State, after promising to prove the existence of (325) a conspiracy, had offered no evidence of it. In such a case it cannot be denied that the admission of the declarations would be illegal and erroneous. The State did not redeem its pledge; it did notPage 229prove a conspiracy of any kind, and therewaserror in the admission of the declarations of Mary Meadows. It is, however, objected that the prisoner cannot now avail himself of the objection, as he has not put it into his bill of exceptions. This is a court of errors, and the proper way to bring cases here for our consideration is by a bill of exceptions; but for the convenience of all parties, the statement of the case, under the sanction of the court, is received in the place of a bill; and it is true, we can take no notice of any objection which is not stated in the case, or does not appear upon the record, properly so called. The prisoner's objection does appear upon the face of the bill tendered by him, as I understand it. Whether there was such a conspiracy as would legalize the acts and declarations of Mary Meadows as evidence against the prisoner was a preliminary question of law and of fact to be decided by the presiding judge. With the errors committed in adjudging the facts submitted to him we have nothing to do; our business is only with errors of law. At the time the evidence of the acts and declarations of Mary Meadows were received it was admitted that it would not be evidence unless a conspiracy was proved. The case does not show that any conspiracy was proved, but in its place a guilty connection, which might or might not be evidence of one, but assuredly was not one; and his Honor in so deciding that it was, as we must understand from the case as sent here, committed an error in law. It is no answer to say that such could not have been in fact the decision of the court. I cannot look to anything which is not in the case, more particularly when the life of a human being is at issue. If the case had stated that a conspiracy to murder James Meadows was proved, the prisoner, so far as this question is concerned, would have been concluded, unless he had (326) set forth in his exception some legal objection to it — as that it was a conspiracy to commit some other crime; and the acts and declarations of Mary Meadows, in furtherance of the common design would have been evidence against him. The case states that "it is unnecessary to go into particulars," that is, of the guilty connection; but the notes of the presiding judge were sent up. I have not looked into them, as they constitute no part of the case.S. v. Godwin,27 N.C. 403. It is objected that these particulars ought to have been set out by the prisoner in the case. I cannot see to what purpose or effect. To my apprehension, the prisoner has omitted nothing it concerned his interest to state. If a bill of exceptions does not state correctly the matter excepted to, the judge is not bound to sign it; otherwise, he is. Here he has signed it, and we must consider it as stating all that was necessary. It is further stated in the case that the prisoner did not complain of the charge. No; the complaint is that the declarations of Mary Meadows were admitted without proof of the existence of a conspiracy, whichPage 230alone could legalize them; and this appears upon the face of the case. I have little doubt that much more was proved at the trial, upon this particular point than is stated in the case, but I must decide it as it is; I cannot look out of the bill of exceptions.
When the declarations were first offered they were objected to, and when the guilty connection was proved the motion to reject them was again renewed in substance. What more the prisoner could do I cannot perceive. It appears to me he did all, through his counsel, it was necessary or proper for him to do to bring his objection before the court. It surely was not necessary for him to ask for an instruction from his Honor that these acts and declarations of Mary Meadows were not evidence against him. His Honor had already decided that (327) they were. I consider the declarations and acts of Mary Meadows as given to the jury without proof of any conspiracy between her and the prisoner, and in this there was error.
In my opinion, the prisoner is entitled to avenire de novo.
It is said that it was the prisoner who tendered the bill of exceptions, and it was his duty to state the fact (if it was a fact) that the declarations of Mary Meadows were admitted in evidence against him, when no combination between her and him to kill the deceased had been established. And, I ask, if he has not done so. If there had in fact been a combination to kill proven on the trial, then the judge ought to have refused to sign this bill of exceptions.
On this ground I think the judgment erroneous. I own that I am entirely of a different opinion from that of my brethren as to the consequences of the deficiencies in the bill of exceptions. It is to be recollected that this is a court of errors, and that every verdict and judgment prove to us their own correctness until the contrary appears. There is nocasesent here, no report of evidence, on which we are to see all the facts set forth, that are legally sufficient to authorize the judgment given. But it lies upon the appellant to allege an error, and then to set forth, in his exceptions, such of the facts of the case as will show the opinion to which he objects to be erroneous in point of law. The bill of exceptions is the production of the appellant, and contains his words, with the signature and seal only of the judge to verify it. Thus looked at, it seems plain to me, when the prisoner's exception says that evidence was given to showaguilty connection between him and Mary Meadows that, in common fairness to the presiding judge and to the State, we must understand him to admit that it establishestheguilty connection before spoken of in the exception, that is, one to murder Meadows. What other can be imagined in reference to this accusation? That, as it strikes me, must be the just interpretation of that expression, if it stood alone. But the conclusion is irresistible to my mind when the prisoner further states in his exception that he does not think it necessary to set out the evidence of that connection; (331) for what else can be inferred therefrom than that the evidencePage 233legally established a guilty connection between the woman and himself, andthat it was such a guilty connection as was relevant to this trial and tothe question of evidence raised by him on the trial?I agree that the statements in the exception are very imperfect and unsatisfactory, such as would not enable us to see distinctly whether the decision was right or wrong. But whose fault is that? Very clearly, the prisoner's. It would have been much more correct to have stated in the exception, for example, what were the acts and declarations of Mary Meadows that were given in evidence, instead of saying merely that they were acts and declarations tending to show hostility; and so of the particular conspiracy alleged, and of that conspiracy (or connection, as it is called) which was proved. But the prisoner declined expressly to have that latter evidence set forth; and, surely, in a court of error he cannot complain that it was not stated, nor insist that, if stated, it would have proved merely a case ofcriminalconnection, or any other connection not relevant to the question then raised. The truth is that even the counsel at the bar, though the same who tried the cause in the Superior Court, did not suggest such an idea; but insisted only on the two points, that it was error to receive the evidence of Mrs. Meadows' acts and declarations, first, because they did not grow out of or concern the common purpose of the prisoner and herself, and, secondly, because they were admittedbeforethe State had proved the conspiracy to kill the husband.
I think, if this were a civil action, no one would doubt that it was not a case for reversal merely because the appellant had not set forth the evidence given to show the kind and extent of the connection between those parties. He would be told that if he chose to keep that in the dark, the judgment could not be reversed, if therecouldbeanyguilty connections that would justify the admission of the evidence, because it was incumbent on him to show affirmatively an error. It is (332) the same in criminal, and even in capital cases; for the statute puts all cases upon the same footing, there being no means of bringing upanycause to this Court but by bill of exceptions and appeal thereon.
Supposing, then, the other point in the case to have been against the prisoner, I could not have united in reversing the judgment because the prisoner declined stating the evidence or used the vague expression, "guilty connection" — if, as the case stands, it can be considered vague. But upon the first ground I concur in reversing the judgment.
PER CURIAM.Venire de novo.Cited: S. v. Dean,35 N.C. 71;S. v. Dula,61 N.C. 214;Hauser v.Tate,85 N.C. 86;S. v. Turner,119 N.C. 848;Henderson Co. v. Polk,149 N.C. 108.Page 234
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