Opinion · Supreme Court of North Carolina

State Ex Rel. Reddick v. Satterfield

31 N.C. 358

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction
North Carolina
Date
1849-06-05
Topic
bankruptcy

Pearson, J. We think his Honor was mistaken in the view, which he took of the case. Admit that the deed of the intestate was void by reason of her infancy, his Honor seems to have been under the impression, that the fund was to be treated as land, and that the plaintiff, as personal representative, could only recover the profits or interest up to the time of the death of the intestate, which, we presume, he considered was for the benefit of the husband, but that the principal belonged to the heirs at law. Without deciding how the rights of the parties may be considered in a Court of Equity, we are of opinion, that in a Court of Law, the defendant, having received money belonging to his ward, was, after her death, bound to pay it over to her personal representative-; and that his re *360 fusal to do so was a clear breach of the bond to the amount of principal and interest. The judgment must be set aside and a venire de no,vo issued.

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Cited by
1 opinion
STATEv. SATTERFIELD,31 N.C. 358(1849)
THE STATE TO THE USE OF WILLIS F. REDDICK v. GEORGE
W. B. SATTERFIELD.
Supreme Court of North Carolina
(June Term, 1849.)
An infant being entitled to a sum of money arising from the sale of a tract of land sold under a decree of a court of equity, and the same having been received by her guardian, conveyed it by a deed of trust to her separate use, and if she died without leaving a child, to her intended husband. She married and died under age and without a child:Held, that in a court of law, at least, her personal representative was entitled to recover the money so received by the guardian.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Law of GATES, at Spring Term, 1849,Manly, J., presiding.
This was an action of debt on a guardian bond. Sarah Ann Hunter, the intestate of the plaintiff, and the ward of the defendant, in 1847, before her marriage, executed a deed, conveying all her estate, among other things the proceeds of the sale of a tract of land sold under the decree of the Court of Equity for partition, which was in the hands of the defendant, herPage 247guardian, to a trustee for her separate use, and if she died without a child living at her death, then to the use of her contemplated husband, one Willis F. Reddick.

The intestate intermarried with the said Reddick, and (359) had a child born alive, but it died before the intestate. At the date of the deed and at the time of her marriage the intestate was about sixteen years of age. She died at the age of eighteen.

The breach assigned was a refusal to pay the amount of about $1,000, the sum received by the defendant as guardian, together with interest thereon from 19 May, 1840; at which time the defendant, as guardian, had received the said amount, being his ward's share of the land sold under the decree of the Court of Equity for partition.

His Honor was of opinion that the plaintiff could only recover the interest upon the sum received by the defendant as guardian; and a verdict and judgment were entered for the plaintiff for the penalty of the bond, to be discharged by the payment of the sum of $549, which was the interest upon the sum received by the defendant.
Heathfor plaintiff.

No counsel for defendant.
PEARSON, J.
We think his Honor was mistaken in the view which he took of the case. Admit that the deed of the intestate was void by reason of her infancy, his Honor seems to have been under the impression that the fund was to be treated as land, and that the plaintiff, as personal representative, could only recover the profits or interest up to the time of the death of the intestate, which, we presume, he considered was for the benefit of the husband, but that the principal belonged to the heirs at law.

Without deciding how the rights of the parties may be considered in a court of equity, we are of opinion that in acourtof lawthe defendant, having received money belonging to his ward, was, after her death, bound to pay it over to her personal representative; and that his refusal to do so was a clear breach of the bond to the amount ofprincipaland (360) interest.

The judgment must be set aside, and avenire de novoissued.

PER CURIAM. Judgment accordingly.Cited: Allison v. Robinson,78 N.C. 224.Page 248