Opinion · Supreme Court of North Carolina

Sugg v. . Tyson

Sugg v. . Tyson, 9 N.C. 472 (N.C. 1823)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction
North Carolina
Date
1823-06-05
Topic
general

Henderson, Judge. This case is not clear of doubts. I can find not one like it. On the one hand, it is plain I, distinguishable from that class of cases where, alter the determination of the marriage, part is given to the husband : there the Huhand is very plainly excluded, because lie cannot take pm l by express words, and the. "whole fey construction.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Sugg v. . Tyson. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
1 opinion
SUGGv. TYSON,9 N.C. 472(1823)
TYSON SUGG v. TYSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF MOAB ROUNTREE; WILLIAMS,
GUARDIAN OF P. WILLIAMS; AND NOBLES, GUARDIAN OF B.
ROUNTREE. — From Pitt.
Supreme Court of North Carolina
June Term, 1823.
In a marriage settlement very informally drawn the Court will look for the true intent of the parties; and as in this case it appeared that personal property which belonged to the wife, and was in her possession, was by the agreement in contemplation of marriage vested in trustees to the use of the husband for life, and afterhisdeath to the use of the wifeand her heirs, and to no other uses, the Court, notwithstanding the language used, viewed the settlement as in restraint of the marital rights. The husband is neither heir nor next of kin to his wife; he answers not the description used,heir of the wife;for though, in determining thequantityof an estate, the wordheirswould be received as a word of expansion or limitation, and the same force allowed it as if the words executors and administrators had been used, yet in arriving at theintentthe Court will consider the common meaning of the wordheir, though it be a technical word; and as here it was not used technically, because applied to personalty, it shall be taken to mean blood relations, on whom the law casts the inheritance on the death of the ancestor, and is the same withnext of kin.
THIS was a bill setting forth that Susanna, the widow of one Richard Williams, having by her said husband a child, P. Williams, and, being possessed of considerable estate, and about to form a matrimonial connection with one Moab Rountree, in contemplation thereof (473) entered into a written contract with said Moab Rountree by which she conveyed certain property to the complainants, in the following words, viz.:

This indenture tripartite, made this 18 March, in the year 1813, between Moab Rountree, of the first part, and Allen Tyson and Peter Sugg, of the second part, and Susanna Williams, of the third part, witnesseth, That the said Moab Rountree, for and in consideration of a marriage intended, by God's permission, shortly to be had and solemnized between the said Moab Rountree and the said Susanna Williams; and, whereas, the said Susanna Williams is possessed of divers negroes, to wit (naming them), and that a competent jointure may be had, made and provided for the said Susanna Williams, in case the said marriage shall take effect, and for settling and assigning of the negroes 5 tables, 4 beds and bedsteads, and furniture, one dozen chairs, 4 looking-glasses, 19 silver spoons, hereinbefore mentioned, to and upon the several uses, interests, and purposes hereinafter mentioned and declared pursuant to the agreement made upon the contract of the said intended marriage, he, the said Moab Rountree, hath granted,Page 268aliened, released, and confirmed, and by these presents doth grant, alien, and confirm unto the said Allen Tyson and Peter Sugg, and their heirs, all and singular, the negroes, 20 head of cattle, 5 horses before named, and also the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, and all the estate of him, the said Moab Rountree, of, in, and to the same premises, and of, in, and to every part and parcel thereof, with the appurtenances, to have and to hold, all and singular, the negroes unto the said Allen Tyson and Peter Sugg, their heirs and assigns, to and for the several uses, interests, trusts, and purposes hereinafter mentioned, limited, expressed, and declared; that is to say, to the use and behoof of the said Moab Rountree and his heirs, until the marriage between him, the said Moab Rountree, and his intended wife shall be had and solemnized; and from and after the solemnization thereof, to the use and behoof of the said Moab Rountree, for and during the term of his natural life, without impeachment of waste; and from and after the determination of that estate, by forfeiture or otherwise, to the use and behoof of the said Allen Tyson and Peter Sugg and their heirs, for and during the natural life of the said Moab Rountree, to preserve and support the contingent remainders hereinafter limited from being defeated and destroyed, and for that purpose to make entries and bring actions as the case shall require; yet, nevertheless, in trust, to permit and suffer the said Moab Rountree to receive and take the rents, issues, and profits thereof, to his and their proper use and benefit, during his natural life; and from and after (474) the decease of the said Moab Rountree to the use and behoof of Susanna Williams, intended wife of the said Moab Rountree, his heirs and assigns forever, and to and for no other use, intent, or purpose whatsoever. In witness whereof, etc.
MOAB ROUNTREE, [L. S.] SUSANNA WILLIAMS, [L. S.] ALLEN TYSON, [L. S.] PETER SUGG, [L. S.]


The contemplated marriage took place, and one child, B. Rountree, was the issue thereof. Susanna Rountree died, leaving her husband, Moab Rountree, the child by her first husband, Williams, to wit, P. Williams, and B. Rountree, her child by her last husband, surviving her. Moab Rountree died soon after, leaving the children surviving him. Administration on his estate was granted to the defendant, Tyson; and the defendants, Williams and Nobles, were appointed guardians to the children respectively. Administration on the estate of Susanna Rountree was granted to Moses Tyson, the younger.Page 269

The bill, after reciting these facts, proceeded to state that most if not all of the property conveyed by the deed above, having been acquired by Susanna Rountree under the will of her former husband, Williams, a considerable part thereof was received on behalf of P. Williams, who was born after the making of her father's will; other parts were disposed of by Rountree after his marriage; but, as to the residue in the hands of complainants, they knew not how to dispose of it, because, for want of technical precision in the deed, they were unable to ascertain who were the beneficial owners thereof. It was severally claimed on behalf of P. Williams, B. Rountree, and by the administrator of Moab Rountree. The bill prayed that these parties might be made defendants, and litigate among themselves the several questions arising on the deed.

Moab Rountree's administrator insisted in his answer that (475) the intention of the parties was as expressed in the deed, and that the conveyance of the property in trust for the said Susanna and her heirs vested the same absolutely in her husband, the said Rountree.
Gaston for the guardians of the children.Mordecai for the administrator of the husband.
HENDERSON, J.
This case is not clear of doubts. I can find not one like it. On the one hand, it is plainly distinguishable from that class of cases where, after the determination of the marriage, part is given to the husband; there the husband is very plainly excluded, because he cannot takepartby express words and thewholeby construction. It is also unlike that class where the wife takes, provisionally, for the same reason. For the sake of brevity, with this class I arrange those cases where the wife may exercise a power. Nor is it like those cases where the next of kin take aspurchasers(480) after an estate for life in the wife; for the husband is notnextof kinto the wife, for all his claims under the law arejure mariti. The cases cited at the bar, 1 and 3 Vesey, jr., and Hen. Mum., and 3 Mum., are illustrative of these principles, and although there are some strong expressions in some of them, such as that the husband takes all but what by contract he gives away, yet they are either to be understood in reference to the subject matter, or they were extra-judicial. It is also unlike those cases where the husband's property, or partly his and partly his wife's, is settled on the wife for jointure, for there the design of the settlement is to confer rights, not as in this case, to abridge them. In this case property, which was the wife's, and in her possession, and which, on the marriage, would have vestedPage 270absolutely in the husband, is, by an agreement made in contemplation of marriage, and solely in relation to the wife's property (for it does not appear that the husband had any), vested in trustees to the use of the husband for life, and after his death to the use of the wife and her heirs,and to no other uses.

I cannot but view this settlement as in restraint of the marital rightsthroughout both limitations;that his rights as husband, which, upon the marriage, would have given him an absolute estate in the property, are, by the agreement, cut down to a life estate; yet the reasons for this opinion are not of that strong and conclusive kind which I should wish to govern my judicial acts, yet they are much stronger than any that occur on the other side. The property belonged to the wife. Theintentanddesignof the settlement were to restrain the rights of the husband, and the words used were proper to those ends. If his rights are extended to an absolute interest, his rights will be concurrent (a thing, I presume, not designed), for he does not pretend to claim, but only in the event of his wife's dying before him. His rights under the settlement continue during his life. He is neither heir or next of kin of the wife, and (481) answers not to the description, or, if you will, expression,heir ofthe wife;for, although in determining thequantityof estate, we must take the wordheirsas a word of expansion or limitation, and allow it the same force as if the words executors and administrators had been used, yet in arriving at the intent we may take hold of the meaning of the wordheir, although it be a technical word; for here it evidently is not used technically, for they are speaking of personal property. Here the wordheirmeans blood relation on whom the law casts the inheritance on the death of the ancestor (and is taken here as next of kin); and, anciently, when lands were not alienable the heir took by succession, and when afterwards lands became alienable, whereby the whole estate became vested in the ancestors, and the heir, by necessity, took by representation, the meaning of the wordheirwas not thereby changed; it still means next of blood on whom the law casts the inheritance on the death of the ancestor. The circuitous and complex mode in which the intention is expressed, if it is in favor of the husband, furnishes an argument against so construing it; for if such had been the intent, the mode of expressing it would have been so obvious, plain, and simple it would have been resorted to, to wit, to the use of the husband absolutely if the wife did not survive him, but if she did, to her absolutely; for this is, in substance, the only effect which the husband contends is produced by this long settlement; and if the intent be as the wife alleges, thatPage 271intent is expressed in a plain, short, and direct manner, perhaps the most appropriate that could be used; only substitute the wordsnext ofkin for heirs. Nor does it weaken, but rather strengthen, this exposition that the drawer was an ignorant man, for that would have led to an attempt to have expressed the intent directly, however awkwardly he might have executed it; and, lastly, that the trustees were to hold upon the trust expressed in the deed, and no other. Upon the whole, I think the whole scope and design of the marriage settlement was to bind and reduce the rights of the husband, of every (482) description, to those given him in the deed, to wit, a life estate.

TAYLOR, C. J., and HALL, J., concurred.

PER CURIAM. Judgment accordingly.Cited: Gee v. Gee,22 N.C. 110.