Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor

276 U.S. 179

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1928-02-20
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that an injury took place on land where a longshoreman was struck by a sling carrying five 200-pound sacks on a wharf, the force of which knocked him off the wharf and into the Mississippi River, where he drowned
  • longshoreman knocked from wharf staging into water by sling being lowered from vessel; state law applicable
  • maritime law inapplicable to claim of longshoreman injured while standing on dock by ship's sling
  • Louisiana workers’ compensation law provided the exclusive remedy because the longshoreman was killed while standing on land and not on navigable waters
  • no maritime jurisdiction because plaintiff was standing on a wharf when struck by hoist on a ship
  • no jurisdiction in case where longshoreman was knocked off wharf by cargo and landed in water
  • longshoreman knocked from dock to water by pierbased sling not covered

Citator

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Cited by
140 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Admiralty & Maritime Law — Jurisdiction — Injuries to Longshoremen Where a longshoreman working on a stage and wharf deemed an extension of the land is struck by a sling from a vessel, thereby knocking him into the water where he dies, the right of action for his death is governed by state law rather than maritime law, because the occurrence that was the sole, immediate, and proximate cause of death—the blow—took effect on land, even though death ultimately occurred in navigable waters. 276 U.S. at 181
  2. Admiralty & Maritime Law — Jurisdiction — Extension of the Land A stage and wharf upon which a longshoreman stands while unloading a vessel are deemed an extension of the land, so that state law applies to injuries occurring there, notwithstanding that the work is maritime in character. 276 U.S. at 181
SMITH SONv. TAYLOR,276 U.S. 179(1928)
48 S.Ct. 228
T. SMITH SON, INC.v. TAYLOR.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS, LOUISIANA.
No. 186.
Argued January 18, 1928.
Decided February 20, 1928.
While a longshoreman, employed in the unloading of a vessel at dock, was standing upon a stage that rested solely upon the wharf and projected a few feet over the water to or near the vessel, he was struck by a sling loaded with cargo, which was being lowered over her side, and was knocked into the water, where some time later he was found dead.Page 180Held, that the right of action for his death was controlled by the state, and not by the maritime, law, since, though the death occurred in the water, the occurrence which was the sole, immediate and proximate cause of it and gave rise to the cause of action, was on the wharf, which was to be deemed an extension of the land. P. 181. 5 La. Ct. App. 284, affirmed.
ERROR to a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana
affirming a recovery under the state workmen's compensation law.
The Supreme Court of the State denied a writ of certiorari.
Mr. John May, with whomMr. Edmund L. Joneswas on the brief, for plaintiff in error.Mr. Eugie V. Parham, with whomMr. Edward Rightorwas on the brief, for defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
March 12, 1925, plaintiff in error, a stevedoring corporation, was unloading a vessel lying in the Mississippi at a dock in New Orleans. George Taylor was in its employ as a longshoreman and came to his death while engaged in that work. Defendant in error is his widow and brought this suit in the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Lawfn*to recover compensation for herself and children. The district court gave judgment for them; the Court of Appeal affirmed; and its presiding judge, after the state Supreme Court had denied a writ of certiorari, allowed the writ of error that brings the case here.

Plaintiff in error maintained below and here insists that this is a case exclusively within the admiralty and maritimePage 181jurisdiction, and that, while the state Compensation Law is broad enough to apply to longshoremen unloading vessels, its application in this case violates § 2 of Art. 3 of the Constitution, which extends the judicial power of the United States "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" and also that clause of § 8 of Art. 1 which authorizes Congress to make laws for carrying into effect the powers granted by the Constitution.

At the time of the accident, cargo was being hoisted out of the hold to deck skids and thence swung to trucks operated upon a stage that rested solely upon the wharf and projected a few feet over the water to or near the side of the vessel. The petition of defendant in error alleged, and she introduced evidence to show, that deceased was standing on the stage when a sling, loaded with five sacks of soda weighing 200 pounds each, was being lowered over the side by means of a winch on the vessel; that the sling was swinging back and forth and, while deceased was trying to catch and steady it, the sling struck him and knocked him off the stage into the water where sometime later he was found dead. At the trial plaintiff in error maintained that deceased was not struck but accidentally fell into the river. The issues were decided in favor of defendant in error and the evidence is amply sufficient to sustain the finding.

Deceased was engaged in maritime work under a maritime contract. If the cause of action arose upon the river, the rights of the parties are controlled by maritime law, the case is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the application of the Louisiana Compensation Law violated § 2 of Art. 3. But, if the cause of action arose upon the land, the state law is applicable.The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 33;Atlantic TransportCo. v.Imbrovek,234 U.S. 52,59;Southern Pacific Co. v.Jensen,244 U.S. 205;Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.Stewart,253 U.S. 149;Washingtonv.Dawson Co.,264 U.S. 219. PlaintiffPage 182in error concedes that the stage and wharf on which deceased was working are to be deemed an extension of the land (ClevelandTerminal R.R. v.Steamship Co.,208 U.S. 316,321;IndustrialComm. v.Nordenholt Co.,259 U.S. 263,275) and that the state law would apply if he had been injured or killed by falling on the landing-place. It argues that as no claim was made for injuries sustained while deceased was on land and as the suit was solely for death that occurred in the river, the case is exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction. But this is a partial view that cannot be sustained. The blow by the sling was what gave rise to the cause of action. It was given and took effect while deceased was upon the land. It was the sole, immediate and proximate cause of his death. TheG.R. Booth,171 U.S. 450,460. The substance and consummation of the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action took place on land.ThePlymouth, supra. This case cannot be distinguished fromJohnsonv.Chicago Elevator Co.,119 U.S. 388,397orMartinv.West,222 U.S. 191,196, The contention of plaintiff in error is without merit.Judgment affirmed.
  1. Page 180 Act 20 of 1914 as amended by Act 243 of 1916, Act 38 of 1918, Acts 234, 244 and 247 of 1920, Act 43 of 1922 and Acts 21 and 216 of 1924. ↩