Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Lambert v. Barrett
159 U.S. 660
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1895-11-25
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- quoted in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 888, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3392, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983)
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Lambert v. Barrett. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 20 opinions
Headnotes
- Habeas Corpus — Effect of Pending Appeal Under section 766 of the Revised Statutes, where an appeal from a final decision of a Circuit Court of the United States denying a writ of habeas corpus to a person alleging restraint of liberty by state authority in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is in process of being heard and determined, any proceeding against that person in respect of the matter under consideration is deemed null and void; the bare pendency of the appeal has that effect, as no order staying proceedings under state authority is made a condition to such stay.
- Habeas Corpus — Termination of Stay on Dismissal of Appeal Where an appeal taken from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed, the supersedeas falls with the disposition of the case; once final judgment is entered and the mandate has issued, the authorities of the State have power to proceed, even if the mandate was delivered to them rather than to the Circuit Court.
- Constitutional Law — Due Process Questions concerning the authority of a state governor to grant a reprieve and to issue a warrant for execution, and whether a new date for execution must be fixed by the trial court, are matters for the determination of the courts of the State; a determination of such questions adversely to a petitioner involves no denial of due process of law or infraction of any provision of the Constitution of the United States.
LAMBERT v. BARRETT,159 U.S. 660(1895)
16 S.Ct. 135
LAMBERTv. BARRETT.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY.
No. 771.
Submitted November 11, 1895.
Decided November 18, 1895.
Petitioner charged that under section 766 of the Revised Statutes any proceedings to carry out the judgment against him by or under the authority of the State of New Jersey before final judgment was entered in the Circuit Court were null and void, and that as such judgment had not been entered, the sheriff restrained him of his liberty for the purpose of carrying the death warrant into execution in violation of that statute of the United States; that the governor had no prerogative, right, or authority under or by virtue of the laws of New Jersey to grant the reprieve or issue the death warrant;Page 662and that the second death warrant was in the nature of a new sentence, which could not be had without the presence of petitioner, and placed petitioner twice in jeopardy of his life; all of which was in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
When in the instance of the first application forhabeascorpusmade by this petitioner, the appeal to this court was dismissed, the supersedeas fell with the disposition of the case; and when final judgment was entered here, and especially after the mandate had issued, the authorities of the State had power to proceed, although the mandate may have been, as is said, delivered to them instead of to the Circuit Court.In reJugiro,140 U.S. 291,295,296.
The constitution of New Jersey provides that the governorPage 663may grant reprieves "to extend until the expiration of a time not exceeding ninety days after conviction;" and by section 123 of the Criminal Procedure Act of that State, it is provided that when a reprieve is granted to any convict sentenced to the punishment of death and he is not pardoned, it shall be the duty of the governor to issue his warrant to the sheriff of the proper county for the execution of the sentence at such time as is therein appointed and expressed. It is contended that if there is no reprieve there can be no warrant; that there was no authority to issue either, except within ninety days after conviction; and that appellant must be brought before the trial court and a new date be fixed for the execution. But these are matters for the determination of the state courts, and they appear to have been passed upon adversely to the petitioner. That result involves no denial of due process of law, or the infraction of any provision of the Constitution of the United States.Lambertv.Barrett,157 U.S. 697;Holdenv.Minnesota,137 U.S. 483;Schwabv.Berggren,143 U.S. 442;McElvainev.Brush,142 U.S. 155,159;In re Cross,146 U.S. 271,278.Order affirmed.