Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Haseltine v. Central Bank of Springfield

183 U.S. 130

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1901-12-02
Topic
general

*131 Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court. The motion to dismiss must be granted. We have frequently held that a judgment reversing that of the court below, and remanding the case for further proceedings, is not one to which a writ of error will lie. The case of Mower v.

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Headnotes

  1. Civil Procedure — Appellate Jurisdiction A state supreme court judgment that reverses the judgment below and remands the case for further proceedings is not a final judgment, and a writ of error will not lie from it; the face of the judgment is the test of its finality, and a reviewing court will not inquire whether the judgment was in fact an actual final disposition of the merits. 183 U.S. at 132–133
  2. Civil Procedure — Appellate Jurisdiction A judgment of reversal and remand is not final even where it settles the law of the case, because it leaves the litigation open and the court below retains power to permit amendments or a new trial; review must await the final judgment entered after remand. 183 U.S. at 133
  3. Civil Procedure — Appellate Jurisdiction A judgment of reversal that remands with an order to enter a specified judgment, leaving nothing to the judicial discretion of the court below, is final and immediately reviewable, and may be distinguished from a remand merely "for further proceedings." 183 U.S. at 132
HASELTINEv. CENT. BK. OF SPRINGFIELD, (NO. 1),183 U.S. 130(1901)
22 S.Ct. 49
HASELTINEv. CENTRAL BANK OF SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI (NO. 1).
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.
No. 62.
Submitted October 29, 1901.
Decided December 2, 1901.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of a State reversing that of the court below, and remanding the case for further proceedings to be had therein, is not a final judgment, nor is this court at liberty to consider whether such judgment was an actual final disposition of the merits of the case. The face of the judgment is the test of its finality.
THIS was an action brought originally in the Circuit Court for
Greene County, Missouri, by the Haseltines against the Central
National Bank, to recover double the amount of certain alleged
usurious interest paid by the plaintiffs to defendant, and which
they sought to recover under the second clause of Rev. Stat. sec.
5198, providing that "in case the greater rate of interest has
been paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his legal
representatives, may recover back, in an action in the nature of
an action of debt, twice the amount of the interest thus paid
from the association taking or receiving the same."
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
for $831.70. From this judgment defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court of the State, which reversed the judgment of the trial
court upon the ground that the plaintiffs had neither paid nor
tendered the principal sum due, and remanded the cause "for
further proceedings to be had therein, in conformity with the
opinion of this court herein delivered."
Defendant moved to dismiss the writ of error upon the ground
that this was not a final judgment.
Mr. S.A. HaseltineandMr. James Bakerfor plaintiffs in error.Mr. John Ridoutfor defendant in error.Page 131
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court.
The motion to dismiss must be granted. We have frequently held that a judgment reversing that of the court below, and remanding the case for further proceedings, is not one to which a writ of error will lie. The case ofMowerv.Fletcher,114 U.S. 127, is not in point, as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State remanded that case to the inferior court with an order to enter a specified judgment, nothing being left to the judicial discretion of the court below. A like ruling was made inAthertonv.Fowler,91 U.S. 143, andCommissioners ofTippecanoe Countyv.Lucas,93 U.S. 108.

While the judgment may dispose of the case as presented, it is impossible to anticipate its ultimate disposition. It may be voluntarily discontinued, or it may happen that the defeated party may amend his pleading by supplying some discovered defect, and go to trial upon new evidence. To determine whether, in a particular case, this may or may not be done, might involve an examination, not only of the record, but even of the evidence in the court of original jurisdiction, and lead to inquiries with regard to the actual final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court, which it might be difficult to answer. We have, therefore, always made the face of the judgment the test of its finality, and refused to inquire whether, in case of a new trial, the defeated party would stand in a position to make a better case. The plaintiffs in the case under consideration could have secured an immediate review by this court, if the court as a part of its judgment of reversal had ordered the Circuit Court to dismiss their petition, when, underMowerv.Fletcher, they might have sued out a writ of error at once.McCombv.Knox County Commissioners,91 U.S. 1, is a case in point. That was a writ of error to the Court of Common Pleas of the State of Ohio. The case had been taken to the Supreme Court of the State, where the judgment of the Common Pleas was reversed for error in sustaining a demurrer to the replies, and overruling that to the answer. Upon suggestion by defendant that he might ask leave to amend his answer, the case was remanded "for further proceedings according toPage 132law." Upon the mandate being filed, defendant did not ask leave to amend his answer, but elected to rely upon his defence already made. Thereupon the court gave judgment against him, and he sued out a writ of error from this court. We held that the judgment of the Supreme Court, being one of reversal only, was not final; that so far from putting an end to the litigation, it purposely left it open; that the law of the case upon the pleadings as they stood was settled, but ample power was left in the Common Pleas to permit the parties to make a new case by amendment; that the final judgment was that of the Common Pleas; that "it may have been the necessary result of the decision of the question presented for its determination; but it is none the less, on that account, the act of the Common Pleas," and was, when rendered, open to review by the Supreme Court. The writ was dismissed. A similar case is that ofGreat Western Telegraph Co. v.Burnham,162 U.S. 339.

This writ of error is therefore dismissed upon the authority ofBrownv.Union Bank of Florida, 4 How. 465;Pepperv.Dunlap, 5 How. 51;Tracyv.Holcombe, 24 How. 426;Moorev.Robbins, 18 Wall. 588;St. Clair Co. v.Lovingston, 18 Wall. 628;Parcelsv.Johnson, 20 Wall. 653;Bakerv.White,92 U.S. 176;Bostwickv.Brinkerhoff,106 U.S. 3;Johnsonv.Keith,117 U.S. 199.Dismissed.