Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Toop v. Ulysses Land Co.
237 U.S. 580
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1915-06-01
- Topic
- real-estate
Mb. Chief Justice White, Memorandum opinion by by direction of the court. The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below,'alleging themselves to be residents of England and subjects of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in 1912 sued the defendants in error to recover a two-thirds interest in a piece of real estate situated in Nebraska. They alleged that John Toop, a resident of Nebraska, who had owned the real estate in question,' died in 1898 intestate and without issue, his widow surviving him, and that as children and grand-children of a deceased brother and sister of Toop they as his heirs became the owners of the two-thirds of the property sued for. It was charged that the right to inherit the property notwithstanding the alleged alienage was secured by a treaty between the United States and Great Britain which took effect in 1900.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Toop v. Ulysses Land Co.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 70 opinions
Headnotes
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Supreme Court Jurisdiction — Direct Appeals The Supreme Court will not entertain jurisdiction of a direct writ of error to review a judgment of a United States District Court under § 238 of the Judicial Code where the federal ground asserted as the basis for jurisdiction is frivolous; a claim that is wholly unsubstantial does not confer jurisdiction even though it appears on the face of the pleadings. 237 U.S. 580 (Memorandum opinion)
- International Law — Retroactive Effect — Alien Inheritance A treaty that does not take effect until after property has vested in the persons legally entitled to take it cannot affect the passage of title; the absence of the treaty at the time title vested cannot be supplied by the fact that a surviving widow retained a life use of the property until after the treaty became operative, because the fee was not suspended during that period but passed to the heirs subject merely to her use. 237 U.S. 580 (Memorandum opinion)
- Constitutional Law — Fourteenth Amendment — Alien Land Ownership A contention that a state statute prohibiting the ownership of real property by non-resident aliens violates the Fourteenth Amendment merely because it forbids such ownership is frivolous and insufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction. 237 U.S. 580 (Memorandum opinion)
No appearance for defendants in error.Mr. R.C. RoperandMr. C.M. Skilesfiled a brief asamicicuriae.
On the face of the pleadings the only ground upon which there is any semblance of jurisdiction to entertain this direct writ of error is the averment of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain. But the absolutely frivolous character of that ground is apparent when it is considered that the treaty only went into effect two years after the death of Toop and the vesting of the property in those entitled legally to take it. It is true that it is now argued — a contention which seems not to have been pressed below — that the treaty is involved because Toop's widow who survived him and died in 1907 after the treaty was adopted had a use of the property during her life and therefore title to it did not pass to the heirs until her death. This, however, does not add substance to the proposition, but only asserts another unsubstantial contention, for it is apparent that the fee of the property was not in suspension until the death of the wife, but passed to the heirs entitled to take, subject, it is true, to the use of the widow, but nevertheless so far as the passage of the title was concerned uncontrolled and uninfluenced by the treaty.
As except for a contention that the state statute forbidding the ownership of real property by aliens was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, which seems alsoPage 583not to have been raised below and which we think also is too frivolous to afford a basis for jurisdiction, what we have said disposes of all the considerations relied upon as the basis for the right to prosecute this direct writ of error, it follows that we are without jurisdiction and the writ is thereforeDismissed for want of jurisdiction.