Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Southern Pacific Co.

United States v. S. Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1922-05-29
Topic
general

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court. The United States on February 11, 1914, filed its bill in the District Court of the United States for the District of *225Utah against the Southern Pacific Company, the Central Pacific Railway Company, the Union Trust Company of New York, and the directors and officials of the Southern Pacific Company. The charge of the petition is that the' defendants restrain or attempt to monopolize, and do monopolize trade and commerce in violation of the Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, known as the Sherman Act, and have also violated the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1862, c. 120, 12 Stat. 489. The prayer of the petition is that the lines of the Southern Pacific Company and those of the Central Pacific Railway Company be decreed to constitute competitive systems, and that the ownership ¿cquired by the Southern Pacific Company of all or a controlling interest in the capital stock of the Central Pacific Railway Company, and its lease, control and operation of the lines thereof be declared violative of the Sherman Act; and that the Southern Pacific Company be required to dispose of such capital stock, and cancel and relinquish its lease, control, management and operation thereof; and that the control of the Central Pacific Railway Company by the Southern Pacific be decreed to be in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1862, entitled “An Act to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from th…

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Headnotes

  1. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade A combination whereby one railroad system, through stock purchases, acquires control of the whole or a vital part of another system that is normally competitive with it, with the effect of materially reducing free and normal competition in interstate trade between the two, violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 259 U.S. at 229
  2. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade Where the Central Pacific Railway System with its eastern connections and the Southern Pacific Railway System are normally competitors for railway traffic moving between California and the Atlantic seaboard and intermediate points, the acquisition in 1899 by the Southern Pacific Company of a controlling part of the stock of the Central Pacific Railway Company constituted a combination made unlawful by the Sherman Act. 259 U.S. at 229
  3. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade The principle that a stock acquisition resulting in unified control of competitive railroad systems violates the Sherman Act does not depend upon the existence of actual competition at the time the combination is formed; the principle is broader than the mere effect upon existing competition between the two systems. 259 U.S. at 230
  4. Antitrust & Competition Law — Prior Consolidation Defense The history of two railroad systems that were always separate and distinct corporations, separately organized, constructed, owned, and largely controlled, does not justify a post-Sherman Act stock purchase upon the theory that there was a prior practical consolidation of the systems antedating the statute through their physical relations and community of stock ownership and control. 259 U.S. at 232
  5. Business & Corporate Law — Corporate Capacity — Leases by Federally Chartered Railroads In view of the important rights and franchises conferred upon the Central Pacific Railroad Company by the United States, a ninety-nine year lease of its railroad made by it in 1885 to its competitor, the Southern Pacific Company, was beyond its corporate capacity, in the absence of any act of Congress authorizing or approving it. 259 U.S. at 233
  6. Business & Corporate Law — Congressional Approval — Inference from Inaction Approval of a lease by a federally chartered railroad is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress had opportunity to learn of it through reports of committees or otherwise; absent legislation authorizing or approving the lease, no such approval exists. 259 U.S. at 234
  7. Antitrust & Competition Law — Contracts Preceding the Sherman Act The fact that a combination or contract in restraint or monopoly of interstate trade was entered into before the date of the Sherman Act does not exempt it from the operation of that statute; no previous contracts or combinations can prevent the application of the Act to compel the discontinuation of illegal combinations. 259 U.S. at 234
  8. Antitrust & Competition Law — Consent or Condonation by Government Settlement Where a commission created by Congress to settle a railroad's debt to the United States accepted, under a settlement plan, the guaranty of the railroad's stock-acquiring affiliate, and the guaranty was neither required nor mentioned in the written settlement agreement, the commission's acceptance of the guaranty was neither in intention nor in effect a condonation of the Sherman Act violation committed in the acquisition of the stock, and the settlement did not estop the Government from prosecuting under that statute. 259 U.S. at 235
  9. Civil Procedure — Joinder A prior decree in an earlier antitrust suit against a different railroad does not conclude the Government on the issues in a later suit where the railroad whose conduct is challenged was not a party to the earlier suit up to the final decree, and the subject-matter of the earlier case and the questions decided in it differ from the subject-matter and questions presented in the later case. 259 U.S. at 240
  10. Remedies — Laches — Suits by the United States A delay of fourteen years in instituting a suit to set aside control gained through a stock purchase is not laches where the time was consumed by an intervening prosecution to set aside related control acquired by another railroad, and the defense of laches is at least doubtful where the suit is brought under an act embodying an expression of public policy enforceable by criminal prosecution and civil suit. 259 U.S. at 240
  11. Antitrust & Competition Law — Relief — Severing Control The decree in a Sherman Act suit challenging unified control of two railroad systems should sever the controlling company's control of the other by stock ownership or by lease, while protecting, so far as compatible, an existing mortgage lien, and should provide by apportionment or joint or common use for both companies' full, convenient, and ready access to terminal lines, cut-offs, and the principal terminal facilities about San Francisco Bay, and make like provision for the lines extending from San Francisco Bay to Sacramento and to Portland, Oregon, so that each company may freely compete and serve the public efficiently. 259 U.S. at 241
  12. Antitrust & Competition Law — Relief — Additional Parties In framing a decree to sever unlawful control between two railroad systems, the district court may and should bring in additional parties whenever that may become advisable in executing the appellate court's directions. 259 U.S. at 241