Opinion · Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Hughey v. Grand River Dam Authority

Hughey v. Grand River Dam Auth., 897 P.2d 1138 (Okla. 1995)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Jurisdiction
Oklahoma
Date
1995-06-01
Topic
general

OP ALA, Justice. Certiorari was granted to resolve the first-impression public-law issue whether the Grand River Dam Authority — a public entity1 — may claim the cloak of tort immunity from premises liability afforded by Oklahoma’s Recreational Land Use Act? We answer in the affirmative. I ANATOMY OF LITIGATION The personal representatives [plaintiffs] of the estates of Larry Mack Glidewell and Rachel Ann Hughey [decedents] brought separate2 wrongful death actions against the Grand River Dam Authority [Authority] occasioned by an incident in which decedents drowned after their boat had struck at night an abandoned railroad bridge in the Horse-creek area of Grand Lake. They alleged the Authority (1) had knowledge of the bridge and (2) negligently failed to provide lights or warning signs in the vicinity of the hazard’s location.

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HUGHEY v. GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY,1995 OK 56
897 P.2d 1138
RICHARD A. HUGHEY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF RACHEL ANN HUGHEY,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY, A PUBLIC OKLAHOMA
CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
CARL MACK GLIDEWELL, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF LARRY MACK GLIDEWELL,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY, A PUBLIC OKLAHOMA
CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Nos. 78183, 79649.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
May 30, 1995.
As Corrected June 1, 1995.
Page 1139
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]Page 1140
Appeal from the District Court, Delaware County, Sam C. Fullerton, J.

On Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Div. 4.

The District Court, Delaware County, Sam C. Fullerton, Judge, ruled summarily for the Grand River Dam Authority in wrongful death actions brought by the personal representatives of the estates of Rachel Ann Hughey and Larry Mack Glidewell, concluding that the Authority was shielded from liability both by the provisions of Oklahoma's Recreational Land Use Act and by the terms of the Government Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

ON CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, THE MEMORANDUM OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE VACATED AND THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN CAUSES NO. 79,649 AND NO. 78,183 ARE AFFIRMED.
Daniel B. Gossett and Cheryl Bisbee, Stipe, Gossett, Stipe, Harper, Estes, McCune Parks, Tulsa, for plaintiffs-appellants.

John F. McCormick, Jr., William A. Caldwell, Pray, Walker, Jackman, Williamson Marlar, Tulsa, and Waldo F. Bales and Allen Pease, Gen. Counsel, Grand River Dam Authority, Vinita, for defendant-appellee.
OPALA, Justice.
[1] Certiorari was granted to resolve the first-impression public-law issue whether the Grand River Dam Authority — a public entity1— may claim the cloak of tort immunity from premises liability afforded by Oklahoma's Recreational Land Use Act? We answer in theaffirmative.
I

[2]ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

[3] The personal representatives [plaintiffs] of the estates of Larry Mack Glidewell and Rachel Ann Hughey [decedents] brought separate2wrongful death actions against the Grand River Dam Authority [Authority] occasioned by an incident in which decedents drowned after their boat had struck at night an abandoned railroad bridge in the Horsecreek area of Grand Lake. They alleged the Authority (1) had knowledge of the bridge and (2) negligently failed to provide lights or warning signs in the vicinity of the hazard's location.

[4] The Authority moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) the Recreational Land Use Act [RLUA]3shields it from legal responsibilityPage 1141and (2) it is also protected by the terms of the Government Tort Claims Act [GTCA]4whose provisionsexemptit from civil liability.5In two identical orders — one in each case — the trial court ruled summarily for the Authority onbothgrounds.6

[5] In separate opinions the Court of Appeals affirmed the nisi prius orders. Certiorari was sought to resolve the first-impression7issues whether (1) RLUA immunity extends to the Authority, (2) certainexceptionsto that immunity may be applied8to these claims and (3) the Authority is protected by the terms of the GTCA. The two appeals stand consolidated for disposition by a single opinion. Because we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative we need not reach the last issue.
II

[6]UNDER THE GTCA SCHEME OF IMMUNITY, GOVERNMENTAL TORTLIABILITY IS COEXTENSIVE WITH THAT OF PRIVATE TORTFEASORS

[7] Neither the RLUA nor the GTCA was enacted in a vacuum. The former — a statute governing premises liability in tort for harm to recreational users of property — must be construed together with the GTCA to effect that act's intent. The overarching principle embodied by the GTCA is thatprivate tort law isneither constricted nor enlarged by that act.Rather, it is made applicable to governmental entities by the state's explicit waiver of sovereign immunity, unless otherwise statutorily specified.9The definitional provisions in the RLUA are sufficientlyPage 1142inclusive so that the Authority could claim that act's immunityaegiseither as a private person or as a governmental entity.10If the Authority is a governmental entity within the meaning of the GTCA, its immunity from tort liability to a recreational user of its waters isderivative,thus shielding it in thesame manneras if the Authority were a private landowner. In light of the GTCA's mandate that government and private tort liability becoequalor coextensive, we hold today the Authority may claim the immunity afforded by the RLUA. Our pronouncement is in conformity with legislatively crafted rules of statutory construction11and with thepreferableapproachtaken by those jurisdictions which have settled this issue.12Today's holding does not offend the purpose for which the RLUA13was enacted.
III

[8]NO ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY THE AUTHORITY ON THELOCUS DELICTIBRING IT WITHIN ANY EXCEPTION TO THE RLUA'S IMMUNITY GRANT

[9] By its express terms the RLUA withholds immunity from premises liability where (1) entrance fees are charged to recreational users of the land/water areas or activities for profit are conducted within the area14or (2) the injury for which liability is sought to be imposed was deliberate, willful or malicious.15The record does not disclose that the Authority charges recreational users of its property an entrance fee. There is no record trail of the variety of commercial or for-profit activity in the Grand Lake area, which are contemplated by the RLUA'sPage 1143exception clause. The plain reading of the RLUA indicates that the type of commercial activity which takes a landowner out of the purview of immunitymust be connected withthe invitees' recreational use of the lands or waters. The Authority's generation of electricity on the land in question — its only commercial activity established by this record — has not been shown to haveany profit-related nexus to the admitted public'spresence upon the premises or with its free use of the locusdelicti.16In short, there is here no probative material of the profit-related link required by law.

[10] Nor does the record contain evidentiary material of the Authority's deliberate, willful or malicious action toward decedents. In short, no exception from the immunity affordable by the general terms of our RLUA could be made applicable to the claims in suit.
IV

[11]THERE IS NO EVIDENTIARY MATERIAL RAISING ACOMMERCIAL-ACTIVITIES ISSUE

[12] A defendant who moves for summary judgment by interposing an affirmative (absolute) defense against liability must show that there is no substantial controversy over the applicable facts that are material to that defense and that all inferences which may be reasonably drawn from undisputed facts tendered are in the moving party's favor.17Once the moving party has made the required showing, the adverse partymust then assume the burdenof demonstrating the existence of a material fact that wouldjustify a trial of that issue.18

[13] In an appeal from summary judgment, review is always limited to the issues shown by the record to have beenactually presentedat nisi priusandactually tenderedbefore the trial judge.19For support of their commercial-activity-exception claim the plaintiffs relied below and do so heresolely on theAuthority's generation of electricityin the Grand Lake vicinity — thelocus in quo.Because they producednoevidentiary materialto show the presence upon the critical place of somedisputed commercial activityin addition to the Authority's admitted generation of electricity, there is no need to theorize about its potential legal effect.
V

[14]PRUDENCE DICTATES THAT THE ABSTRACT QUESTION — WHETHER THEAUTHORITY IS EXEMPTED FROM LIABILITY BY THE TERMS OF THE GTCA— NOT BE REACHED IN THIS CASE

[15] Courts are not allowed to forecast what they might do about an issue that is not before them.20It is wise that wePage 1144remain true to this principle todayand not speculate in gratis dictaconcerning the GTCA's effect on the Authority's claimedimmunity.21It suffices to hold that the Authority is immune by the RLUA in the same manner as private landowners. It does not matter if (a) the § 155exemptionsin the GTCA mightalsoprotect the Authority or (b)that the Authority falls within theprotective cloak of the GTCA.To settle either of thesepurelyacademicissues in the context of this appeal would amount to nothing more than a needless judicial gaze into Odin's well. We elect today to resist the temptation.
VI

[16]CONCLUSION

[17] The Authority is immune from liability for plaintiffs' lossregardless of whetherit is a private person or a governmental entity. This is so because by the provisions of the GTCA the state and any of its political subdivisions bear tort accountabilityin the same mannerand to the same extent as a private entity. Neither the Authority's activity on thesitusof the injury nor any of its acts (or omissions) toward decedents can bring these two claims within anyexception toRLUA-conferred immunity.Today's holding makes moot the tendered dispute over the Authority's claimedexemptionfrom liability under the GTCA.22

[18] ON CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, THE MEMORANDUM OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE VACATED AND THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN CAUSES NO. 79,649 AND NO. 78,183 ARE AFFIRMED.

[19] HODGES, LAVENDER, SIMMS and HARGRAVE, JJ., concur.

[20] ALMA WILSON, C.J., KAUGER, V.C.J., and SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
[21] SUMMERS, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[22] InBoyd v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Army Corps,830 P.2d 577(Okla. 1992) we left unresolved the question of whether the Recreational Use Act (2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-315[2-1301-315]) applies to the State of Oklahoma and its subdivisions. That was because the presence of commercial activity in the park area eliminated any possibility of the Act's availability as a defense, and thus the issue was not before us. Today's opinion resolves the unanswered question in favor of applicability of the Act for the benefit of the Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA),1and I agree.

[23] Prior to the enactment of the Governmental Tort Claims Act the GRDA had its own statutory version of a waiver of sovereign immunity for certain types of actions. The GRDA had the right and privilege: "To sue and be sued in its corporate name in contracts, reverse condemnation, tort, equity, mandamus and similar actions. . . ." 82 O.S. 1991 § 862[82-862](l). The GRDA is liable for "damage caused by said district, its agents,Page 1145servants and employees in creating, constructing, maintaining or operating said district to any corporation, partnership, person or individual whose property, either real or personal, within or without said district, . . . ." 82 O.S. 1991 § 862[82-862](s). This waiver of sovereign immunity for certain types of actions placed the GRDA in the same position as a private litigant.Grand RiverDam Authority v. Grand-Hydro,188 Okla. 506,111 P.2d 488, 489-490 (1941). As a private litigant a defendant, and therefore the GRDA, is entitled to the protection afforded by the Recreational Use Act.

[24] The same holds true as to the Governmental Tort Claims Act. The Governmental Tort Claims Act incorporates the law applicable to private persons and makes it applicable to the State and its political subdivisions. The Governmental Tort Claims Act states that the State and its subdivisions shall be liable for loss, subject to the limitations of that Act, "if a private person or entity, would be liable for money damages under the laws of this state." 51 O.S. 1991 § 153[51-153]. A private person's liability (and immunity) is determined by application of the Recreational Use Act and thus, so too the liability of the GRDA is determined by application of that Act.

[25] States are divided on this issue. The Supreme Court of Louisiana canvassed the cases and legal articles, and came to the conclusion that those states applying the Recreational Use Act to government agencies did so because in those states a governmental defendant's liability was imposed to the same extent that liability was imposed upon private individuals.Monteville v.Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government,567 So.2d 1097, 1103 (La. 1990). The Tenth and Ninth Circuit federal courts have also stated that the same policy for applying the Recreational Use Act to private persons is present when a government agency is involved.Jones v. United States of America,693 F.2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982);Klepper v. City of Milford, Kansas,825 F.2d 1440, 1444 (10th Cir. 1987). What the Court does today is consistent with 51 O.S. 1991 § 153[51-153] and those courts that similarly impose governmental liability to the extent that private persons are liable. Thus, I concur with the opinion insofar as it extends the Recreational Use Act to the state and its subdivisions.

[26] Where I must take leave of the Court's opinion is in its affirmance of the summary judgment. Summary judgment based on the Recreational Use Act is appropriate in a case where the facts are uncontroverted that no "commercial or other activity for profit is conducted on such park area, or any part thereof." 2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-315[2-1301-315](C). I do not read the evidentiary material before the trial judge as establishing that as an uncontroverted fact. Thus I would leave the GRDA's defense based on an absence of commercial activity for the trier of fact.

[27] I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ALMA WILSON, Vice Chief Justice KAUGER and Justice WATT join in these views.
  1. The terms of 82 O.S. 1991 § 861[82-861] provides in pertinent part:

    "There is hereby created within the State of Oklahoma a conservation and reclamation district to be known as `Grand River Dam Authority', hereinafter called the district. . . . Such district shall be, and is hereby declared to be, agovernmental agencyof the State of Oklahoma, body politic and corporate. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) ↩
  2. The trial court consolidated the two cases. Hughey's action was then dismissed and later refiled. ↩
  3. The terms of 2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-315[2-1301-315] provides in pertinent part:

    "A. The purpose of [the RLUA] is to encourage persons to make available to the public land, water areas and park areas for outdoor recreational purposes by limiting their liability to persons going thereon. . . .

    B. An owner or lessee who provides the public with a park area for outdoor recreational purposesowes noduty of careto keep that park area safe for entry or use by others, or to give warning to persons entering or going on that park area of any hazardous conditions,structuresor activities thereon. An owner or lessee who provides the public with a park area for outdoor recreational purposes shallnotby providing that park area:

    * * * * * *

    2. Incuranyduty of care toward a person who goes on the park area. . . ." (Emphasis added.) ↩
  4. 51 O.S. 1991 §§ 151[51-151]et seq. ↩
  5. The Authority invoked the terms of 51 O.S. 1991 § 155[51-155] which provide in pertinent part:

    "The state . . . shall not be liable if a loss or claim results from:

    * * * * * *

    9. Entry upon any property where that entry is expressly or impliedly authorized by law; 10. Natural conditions of property of the state . . . [or]

    * * * * * *

    13. Inspection powers or functions, including failure to make an inspection, review or approval, or making an inadequate or negligent inspection, review or approval of any property, real or personal, to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety, or fails to conform to a recognized standard. . . ." ↩
  6. The trial court ruled (1) decedents' claims are barred by the RLUA, (2) Authority's electrical generation conducted on thelocus delictiis not "for profit" within the meaning of 2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-315[2-1301-315](C),infranote 8 and (3) the Authority isexemptfrom liability by the terms of the GTCA, 51 O.S. 1991 § 155[51-155],supranote 5. ↩
  7. TheUnited Statesmay claim the immunizing benefits of Oklahoma's RLUA for purposes of avoiding liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act,28 U.S.C. § 1346, 2671-2680.See Boydv. U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers,881 F.2d 895, 899 (10th Cir. 1989);Cox v. U.S.,881 F.2d 893, 895 (10th Cir. 1989). The question whether the RLUA applies to the State of Oklahoma or to its political subdivisions has never been settled.Boyd v. U.S.ex rel. U.S. Army Corps,Okla.,830 P.2d 577, 580 n. 3 (1992) [Boyd II]. ↩
  8. The terms of 2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-315[2-1301-315]alsostate in pertinent part:

    "C. This section shallnotapply if there is any charge made or usually made by entering or using such park area, or any part thereof, or if any commercial or other activity for profit is conducted on such park area or any part thereof.

    * * * * * *

    E. [The RLUA] doesnotrelieve any person of liability which would otherwise exist for want of ordinary care or for deliberate, willful or malicious injury to persons or property. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

    Appellants urged at nisi prius that the Authority's generation of electricity in the Grand Lake area constitutes commercial activity within the meaning of § 1301-315(C),supra. ↩
  9. The GTCA was a legislative response to this court's abrogation of sovereign immunity inVanderpool v. State,Okla.,672 P.2d 1153, 1156-1157 (1983). The act is both an adoption and conditional waiver of the sovereign immunity doctrine. The terms of 51 O.S. 1991 § 152.1[51-152.1] provide in pertinent part:

    "A. The State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The state . . . whether performing governmental or proprietary functionsshall be immune from liability for torts.

    B. The state,only to the extent and in the mannerprovided in this actwaives its immunity . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

    The terms of 51 O.S. 1991 § 153[51-153](A) provide in pertinent part:

    "The state . . . shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts . . .subject to the limitations andexceptions specified in this act and only where thestate, . . . if a private person or entity,would be liable for money damages under the laws of this state. . . ." (Emphasis added.) ↩
  10. The terms of 2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-102[2-1301-102] provide in pertinent part:

    "As used in [the RLUA]:

    * * * * * *

    4. The term `person' means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, organization or any combination thereof, whether or not incorporated." ↩
  11. The terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 2[12-2] provide in pertinent part:

    ". . . [T]he rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof, shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any general statute of Oklahoma; but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their object."

    The terms of 25 O.S. 1991 § 29[25-29] provide:

    "The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to the laws of this state, which are to be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects. . . ."See Citizens' State Bank v. Strahan,63 Okla. 288,165 P. 189, 191 (1917);cf. Republic Bank Trust v. Bohmar Minerals,Okla.,661 P.2d 521, 523 (1983);Riffe Petroleum Co. v. Great Nat.Corp., Inc.,Okla.,614 P.2d 576, 579 (1980) (astatutecreating a lien in derogation of the common law will bestrictlyconfined to the ambit of the enactment giving it birth). The RLUA stands in derogation of the common law under which a landowner owes a duty of care to those entering the premises — the rigor of that duty depending upon the entrant's status as trespasser, licensee or invitee.See, e.g., Taylor v.Hynson,Okla.,856 P.2d 278, 281 (1993);Brewer v. IndependentSchool Dist. No. 1,Okla.,848 P.2d 566, 570-571 (1993);Lohrenzv. Lane,Okla.,787 P.2d 1274, 1277 (1990);Sutherland v. SaintFrancis Hospital, Inc.,Okla.,595 P.2d 780, 781 (1979). ↩
  12. Anderson v. City of Springfield,406 Mass. 632,549 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (1990);Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Res.D.,415 N.W.2d 505, 508 (N.D. 1987);McCord v. Ohio Div. ofParks Recreation,54 Ohio St.2d 72,375 N.E.2d 50, 52 (1978) (these cases hold that governmental tort liability is governed by the same principles that apply to actions involving private parties and that governmental entities are put on the same footing as private tort defendants).See also in this connectionPoole v. City of Gadsden,541 So.2d 510, 513 (Ala. 1989);McGhee Through McGhee v. City of Glenns Ferry,111 Idaho 921,729 P.2d 396, 397 (1986) (these cases immunize governmental entities under statutory schemesdifferentfrom Oklahoma's RLUA). The reasoning expressed in jurisprudence —Ferres v. Cityof New Rochelle,68 N.Y.2d 446,510 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61-63,502 N.E.2d 972, 977 (1986);Delta Farms Rec. Dist. 2028 v. Super.Ct. Etc.,33 Cal.3d 699,190 Cal.Rptr. 494, 499,660 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1983) — that denies public entities the benefit of recreational land use statutes is fatally flawed for its failure to recognize the overarching principle of legislation modifying the doctrine of sovereign immunity. ↩
  13. The terms of 82 O.S. 1991 § 875[82-875] provide in pertinent part:

    "A. The [Authority]shall not prevent freepublic use of its lands and lakes forrecreationalpurposes. . . .

    B. . . .[N]o charge shall ever be made to thepublicfor right to engage in . . .boating. . . in said lakes. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

    The policy that guides the RLUA is to encourage opening of lands and waters to the public for recreational use. 2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-315[2-1301-315](A),supranote 3. ↩
  14. 2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-315[2-1301-315](C),supranote 8. ↩
  15. 2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-315[2-1301-315](E),supranote 8. ↩
  16. The Legislature clearly didnotintend that commercial activityunrelated toland/water use by invited guests be a bar to immunity. The offending commercial or other "for-profit" activity that deprives the landowner of RLUA immunity must be connected with the invited public's use of the premises.BoydII, supranote 7 at 580; 2 O.S. 1991 § 1301-315[2-1301-315](C),supranote 8. Within the RLUA's contemplation, it is only the landowner inviting the public for afreeuse of the property,butconducting or allowing in thelocus in quoa for-profit activityintended to involvethe invited public, who loses the benefit of the Act-conferred immunity.Boyd II, supranote 7 at 580. ↩
  17. Martin v. Chapel, Wilkinson, Riggs, and Abney,Okla.,637 P.2d 81, 84 (1981);Runyon v. Reid,Okla.,510 P.2d 943, 946 (1973). ↩
  18. Boren v. Kirk,Okla.,878 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1994);Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Elec. Co-op, Inc.,Okla.,792 P.2d 50, 55 (1990);Martin, supranote 17 at 84;Weeks v. WedgewoodVillage, Inc.,Okla.,554 P.2d 780, 785 (1976). ↩
  19. Frey v. Independence Fire and Cas. Co.,Okla.,698 P.2d 17, 20 (1985);Northrip v. Montgomery Ward Co.,Okla.,529 P.2d 489, 494 (1974);Ajax Contractors, Inc. v. Myatt,Okla.,424 P.2d 30, 35 (1967);Board of County Com'rs of Choctaw Co. v.Schuessler,Okla.,358 P.2d 830, 832 (1960).See also Dyke v.Saint Francis Hosp., Inc.,Okla.,861 P.2d 295, 299-300 (1993);Ind. Nat. Bank v. State Dept. of Human S.,Okla.,857 P.2d 53, 64 (1993);Smith v. State, ex rel. Bd. of Regents,Okla.,846 P.2d 370, 372 n. 6 (1993) (Opala, J., with whom Hargrave and Summers, JJ., joined, dissenting). ↩
  20. "Every judgment must be read as applicable to theparticular facts proved or assumed to be proved,since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but govern and are qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found." (Emphasis added.) Lord Halsbury's famous passage in Quin v. Leathem [1901] A.C. 495 at p. 506, quoted in RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 37 (1961). ↩
  21. Northeast Okla. Elec. v. Corporation Com'n,Okla.,808 P.2d 680, 683 (1991);Westinghouse Elec. v. Grand River DamAuth.,Okla.,720 P.2d 713, 718 (1986);Traders Compress Co. v.Board of Review, Okla. Employment Security Commission,203 Okla. 564,224 P.2d 268(1950).See also Application of Goodwin,Okla.,597 P.2d 762, 765 n. 8 (1979). ↩
  22. Seethe terms of 51 O.S. 1991 § 155[51-155],supranote 5. ↩
  23. The Grand River Dam Authority is a conservation and reclamation district created by statute. 82 O.S. 1991 § 861[82-861]. Section 861 also states that: Such district shall be, and is hereby declared to be, a governmental agency of the State of Oklahoma, body politic and corporate, with powers of government and with authority to exercise the rights, privileges and functions hereinafter specified, including control storing, preservation and distribution of the waters of the Grand River and its tributaries, for irrigation, power and other useful purposes and reclamation and irrigation of arid, semiarid and other lands needing irrigation, and the conservation and development of the forests, minerals, land, water and other resources and the conservation and development of hydroelectric power and other electrical energy, from whatever source derived, of the State of Oklahoma. ↩