Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Gasquet v. Lapeyre

Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367 (1917)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1917-01-08
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • Suspension Clause of Article I, § 9 of Constitution does not restrict state action, only national action
  • “any obligations arising out of the Suspension 2 Clause fall on Congress and the federal courts, not on the courts of the 3 State of California.”
  • the Suspension Clause is not a limitation on state action

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Gasquet v. Lapeyre. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
50 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Habeas Corpus The provision in § 9 of Article I of the Constitution guaranteeing the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a limitation upon state action, but restricts only national action. 242 U.S. 367 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135)
  2. Constitutional Law — Fourteenth Amendment An issue respecting the jurisdiction of a state court under the constitution and statutes of that State remains a question of state law, and the decision of that question by the state court of last resort is binding upon the Supreme Court; nothing in the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment converts such an issue into a federal question. 242 U.S. 367 (citing Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393)
  3. Constitutional Law — Full Faith and Credit The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the act of Congress passed to carry it into effect require that a judgment of a court of one State, if founded upon adequate jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter, be given the same faith and credit in a court of another State that it has by law or usage in the courts of the State of its rendition; because courts of one State are not presumed to know the laws or usage of another, the record of the judgment must be brought to the attention of the court by appropriate allegation and proof, or in some other recognized mode, and where the law or usage of the State of rendition is not so brought to the court's attention, an essential step in invoking the clause is omitted. 242 U.S. 367 (citing Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1)
GASQUETv. LAPEYRE,242 U.S. 367(1917)
37 S.Ct. 165
GASQUETv. LAPEYRE ET AL.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.
No. 116.
Argued November 16, 1916.
Decided January 8, 1917.
The provision in § 9 of Article I of the Constitution guaranteeing the privilege ofhabeas corpusis not a limitation upon state action. A decision of a state Supreme Court, involving only the construction of the state constitution and statutes respecting the jurisdiction ofPage 368state courts, can raise no question under the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. To invoke the full faith and credit clause and the act of Congress passed to carry it into effect, Article IV, § 1; Rev. Stats., § 905, on behalf of a judgment of one State in a court of another, it is necessary by allegation or proof, or in some other recognized mode, to bring to the attention of that court the law or usage which defines the effect of the judgment in the State of its rendition. Assignments of error contrary to the foregoing propositions are frivolous. Writ of error to review136 La. 957, dismissed.
THE case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. William Winans Wall, with whomMr. J.C. Gilmore, Mr.Thos. GilmoreandMr. Edward N. Pughwere on the briefs, for plaintiff in error.Mr. George Denegre, Mr. Victor LeovyandMr. Henry H.Chaffefor defendants in error, submitted.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the court.
In a proceeding against the plaintiff in error, wherein he was fully heard, the civil district court of the parish of his residence and domicile pronounced a judgment of interdiction against him. He appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, which affirmed the judgment (136 La. 957), and thereafter he sued out this writ of error. Our jurisdiction is challenged by a motion to dismiss.

There are three assignments of error, and the facts essential to an understanding of two of them are these: After the judgment of interdiction and before the hearing upon the appeal the plaintiff in error, who was in custody under an order of the criminal district court of the parish committing him to an asylum as a dangerous insane person, secured his release from such custody through anPage 369original proceeding inhabeas corpusin the court of appeal of the parish, which adjudged that he had recovered his sanity. He then called the attention of the Supreme Court to this judgment and insisted that it was decisive of his sanity at a time subsequent to the judgment of interdiction and wasres judicataof the issue presented on the appeal. But the Supreme Court held that under the state constitution and statutes the court of appeal was without jurisdiction and therefore its judgment was notres judicata. In the assignments of error it is said of this ruling, first that it practically suspended the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpuscontrary to § 9 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States, and, second, that it denied the plaintiff in error the due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it did not give proper effect to certain provisions of the constitution and statutes of the State bearing upon the jurisdiction of the court of appeal and the Supreme Court. Both claims, in so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, are so obviously ill founded and so certainly foreclosed by prior decisions that they afford no basis for invoking our jurisdiction. Section 9 of Article I, as has long been settled, is not restrictive of state, but only of national, action.Munnv.Illinois,94 U.S. 113,135;Morganv.Louisiana,118 U.S. 455,467;Johnsonv.ChicagoPacific Elevator Co.,119 U.S. 388,400. This is also true of the Fifth Amendment.Barronv.Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243;Boothv.Indiana,237 U.S. 391,394;Hunterv.Pittsburgh,207 U.S. 161,176. And, as our decisions show, there is nothing in the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing due process and equal protection which converts an issue respecting the jurisdiction of a state court under the constitution and statutes of the State into anything other than a question of state law, the decision of which by the state court of last resort is binding upon this court.Iowa Central Ry. Co. v.Iowa,160 U.S. 389,393;Page 370Castillov.McConnico,168 U.S. 674,683;Rawlinsv.Georgia,201 U.S. 638;Burtv.Smith,203 U.S. 129,135;Standard Oil Co. v.Missouri,224 U.S. 270,280-281;deBearnv.Safe Deposit Co.,233 U.S. 24,34;McDonaldv.Oregon R.R. Navigation Co., ibid., 665, 669-670;Missouriv.Lewis,101 U.S. 22,30.

The facts bearing upon the remaining assignment are as follows: After the judgment of affirmance by the Supreme Court and during the pendency of a petition for rehearing, the plaintiff in error, claiming that upon his release from custody byhabeas corpushe had removed to, and become a resident and citizen of, Shelby County, Tennessee, petitioned the probate court of that county for an inquisition respecting his sanity. The court entertained the petition and within a day or two rendered a judgment thereon finding that the plaintiff in error had become a resident and citizen of Tennessee, adjudging that he was sane and able to control his person and property and declaring that any disability arising from the proceedings in Louisiana was thereby removed. He then brought the proceedings in Tennessee — all certified conformably to the law of Congress — to the attention of the Louisiana Supreme Court by a motion wherein he insisted that under the Constitution of the United States, Article IV, § 1, and the law passed by Congress to carry it into effect, Rev. Stats., § 905, the judgment in Tennessee was conclusive of his residence and citizenship in that State and of his sanity and ability to care for his person and property, and that in consequence the interdiction proceeding should be abated. But the motion was denied, along with the petition for a rehearing, and in the assignments of error it is said that in denying the motion the court declined to give the judgment in Tennessee the full faith and credit required by the Constitution and the law of Congress.

There are several reasons why this assignment affordsPage 371no basis for a review here, but the statement of one will suffice. What the Constitution and the congressional enactment require is that a judgment of a court of one State, if founded upon adequate jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter, shall be given the same faith and credit in a court of another State that it has by law or usage in the courts of the State of its rendition. This presupposes that the law or usage in the latter State will be brought to the attention of the court in the other State by appropriate allegation and proof, or in some other recognized mode; for the courts of one State are not presumed to know, and therefore not bound to take judicial notice of, the laws or usage of another State.Hanleyv.Donoghue,116 U.S. 1;Chicago Alton Railroadv.Wiggins Ferry Co.,119 U.S. 615;Lloydv.Matthews,155 U.S. 222,227;Western IndemnityCo. v.Rupp,235 U.S. 261,275. Here the law or usage in Tennessee where the judgment was rendered was not in any way brought to the attention of the Louisiana court, and therefore an essential step in invoking the full faith and credit clause was omitted. In this situation the claim that the Louisiana court refused to give effect to that clause is so devoid of merit as to be frivolous.Writ of error dismissed.