Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Gut v. State
Gut v. State, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35 (1870)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1870-02-14
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- “An ex post facto law does not involve, in any of its definitions, a change of the place of trial of an alleged offence after its commission.”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Gut v. State. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 58 opinions
Headnotes
- Constitutional Law — Ex Post Facto A law that changes the place of trial of an alleged offense after its commission — whether to another county in the same district or to a different district from that in which the offense was committed or the indictment found — is not an ex post facto law, even when passed subsequent to the commission of the offense or the finding of the indictment.
- Constitutional Law — Ex Post Facto An ex post facto law is one that renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed; that imposes a punishment for an act not punishable at the time it was committed, imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed, or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required. A change in the place of trial of an alleged offense after its commission does not fall within any of these definitions.
- Constitutional Law — State Constitutional Guarantees — Federal Review The provision of a state constitution securing to an accused a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the crime was committed is of the highest importance, as it prevents sending the accused for trial to a remote district, away from friends and among strangers who may be animated by personal or partisan prejudice; but its enforcement in cases arising under state laws is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the state court's ruling that a state law does not violate that provision is conclusive upon the federal courts.
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Venue A state law that changes the place of trial within a district in which the crime was committed, where jurors for offenses in counties attached together for judicial purposes are drawn from all of the counties in the district, does not deprive the accused of a jury of the district previously ascertained by law.
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
The objection to the act of Minnesota, if there be any, *37 does not rest on the ground that it is an ex post facto law, and, therefore, within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution. It must rest, if it has any force, upon that provision of the State constitution which declares that, “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by aj impartial jury of the county or district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” But the Supreme Court of the State has held that the act in question is not in conflict with this provision; that the act does not change the district, but merely the place of trial in the district, which is not forbidden.. And it appears that jurors for the trial of criminal offences committed in one of the counties of the several attached together for judicial purposes, are chosen from all the counties; and that this was the law before, as it has been since the passage of the act which is the subject of complaint. Therefore the defendant, had he not secured, by his own motion, a change of venue, would have had a jury of the district in which the crime was committed, and which district was previously ascertained by law.
The ruling of the State court is conclusive upon this court, upon the point that the law in question does not violate the constitutional provision cited. *
Undoubtedly the provision securing to the accused a public trial within the county or district in which the offence is committed is of the highest importance. It prevents the possibility of sending him for trial to a remote district, at a distance from friends, among strangers, and perhaps parties animated by prejudices of a personal or partisan character; ■but its enforcement in cases arising under State laws is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.
A law changing the place of trial from one county to another county in the same district, or even to a different district from that in which the offence -was committed, or the *38 indictment found, is not an ex post facto law, though passed subsequent to the commission of the offence or the finding of the indictment. An ex post facto law does not involve, in any of its definitions, a change of the place of trial of an alleged offence after its commission. It is defined by Chief Justice Marshall, in Fletcher v. Peck, * to be a law, “which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed;” and in Cummings v. Missouri, † with somewhat greater fulness, as a law “ which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence, by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required.”
The act of Minnesota under consideration has no feature which brings it within either of these definitions.
Judgment affirmed.