Is Harley v. United States still good law?

Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Harley v. United States

198 U.S. 229

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1905-05-08
Topic: general

How later courts describe this case

excluding from Tucker Act coverage “obligations that the law is said to imply from a tort”

Citator

Harley v. United States has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 23 S. Ct. 349 (overruled by United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, 312 U.S. 592 (1941)). Read them before relying on it. 39 later decisions cite it.

Authority status: caution
Cited by: 39 opinions

Headnotes

Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Court of Claims — Contract Claims To give the Court of Claims jurisdiction under the Act of March 3, 1887, the demand sued on must be founded on a convention between the parties — a coming together of minds; contracts or obligations that the law implies from a tort do not satisfy this condition. 198 U.S. at 234
Contracts Law — Mutual Assent — Implied-in-Fact Contracts with the Government No contract arises between the United States and an inventor for the Government's use of his patented device where the findings establish that the inventor supposed he would be paid but the Government officers supposed and understood that he, being an employee of the Treasury Department, would neither expect nor demand remuneration; the absence of a coming together of minds is fatal to the claim, and the use of the device cannot create a right independent of the understanding under which it was used. 198 U.S. at 234-235
Contracts Law — Mutual Assent — Duty to Make Explicit Demand An inventor who claims compensation from the Government for its use of his patented device must make an explicit demand; a subordinate employee is not excused from doing so on a theory of coercion where he delayed making any demand for over fourteen years, across successive Chiefs of Bureau and Secretaries of the Treasury, while the Government used the device without any election of the terms on which it would use it. 198 U.S. at 235-236

HARLEYv. UNITED STATES,198 U.S. 229(1905)

25 S.Ct. 634

HARLEYv. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 195.

Argued April 6, 1905.

Decided May 8, 1905.

In order to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction under the act of March 3, 1887, the demand sued on must be founded on a convention between the parties — a coming together of minds — and contracts or obligations implied by law from torts do not meet this condition.Russellv.United States,182 U.S. 516,530. An employe of the Bureau of Printing and Engraving, who at his own cost and in his own time perfected and patented a device for registering impressions in connection with printing presses, which with his knowledge and consent was used for many years by the Bureau, under orders of the Secretary of the Treasury, and who during that period never made any demand for royalties, cannot, under the circumstances of this case, recover such royalties in the Court of Claims on the ground that a contract existed between him and the Government, because, prior to the use of the device by the Government, the Chief of the Bureau promised to have his rights to the invention protected.

APPELLANT sued in the Court of Claims to recover the sum of

$102,000, for the use, during the six years preceding the

commencement of the suit, of a device invented by the appellant

for registering impressions in connection with printing presses.

The Court of Claims dismissed the petition. The findings of the

Court of Claims are as follows:

"II. In November, 1869, the Secretary of the Treasury

determined that certain valuable securities should not be printed

in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing until proper and reliable

registers should be attached to the presses. While the Chief of

the Bureau was endeavoring to devise and procure a trustworthy

form of register, the claimant brought to him the drawings of a

device which he had invented, being substantially the device

described in the foregoing letters patent. The Chief of the

Bureau ordered a register to be immediately made after the

claimant's device. At the time of giving such order he understood

that the device was the claimant's invention.

"The register so ordered being completed, and tried and found

satisfactory, the Chief of the Bureau proposed to take the

claimant to the Secretary of the Treasury that he might

Page 230

explain it to him. The claimant thereupon objected that the

invention was not yet patented, and that he wished, before

exhibiting it, to obtain a patent for his individual protection.

The Chief of the Bureau replied, `Certainly; I will see that you

are protected.' The claimant, then tacitly consenting, was taken

before the Secretary, and explained to him the operation of the

this was the register which the claimant had invented. The

Secretary approved the form of register, and directed that such

registers be made and attached to the presses in the Bureau.

"Before such registers were manufactured the claimant

remonstrated to the effect that he wished first to secure a

patent. The Chief of the Bureau replied that he would see the

claimant protected and would get him a patent attorney who would

explain the law to him. This the Chief of the Bureau did, and the

attorney so selected proceeded to procure the patent before set

forth, the claimant, not the defendants, paying him and the costs

and expenses thereof. The attorney so selected at the same time

informed the claimant that the manufacture and use of registers

in the Bureau would not interfere with or prevent the procurement

of the patent.

"After being so advised, the claimant raised no further

objection to the registers being manufactured and used, and

tacitly acquiesced in the same.

"There was no agreement or understanding between the parties

in regard to royalty or the payment of remuneration for the use

of the claimant's invention in the Government's printing and

engraving other than such as may be inferred from the preceding

conversations. On the part of the claimant it was supposed and

understood that he would be entitled to compensation, and that it

would be allowed and paid by the Secretary of the Treasury. But

on the part of the Secretary and Chief of the Bureau it was

supposed and understood that the claimant, being an employe of

the Treasury Department, would neither expect nor demand

remuneration.

Page 231

"III. That ever since the issuance of said letters patent the

defendant has constructed, and has used continuously, from the

date of said letters patent, to wit, March 1, 1870, upon and in

connection with plate printing presses used by the defendant in

the Bureau of Engraving and Printing and in the Treasury

building, the device aforesaid, so patented to the claimant, for

the purpose of registering the number of impressions made by the

various plate-printing presses, both hand and steam, employed and

used by the defendant in the said Bureau of Engraving and

Printing and in the Treasury Department building.

"IV. The claimant at the time of the making of his invention

before described was assistant master machinist in the Bureau of

Engraving and Printing. He was never assigned to the duty of

making inventions, and it was not a part of his duty to do so;

and the invention before described was made within his own time

and exclusively at his own cost, and was a completed invention,

properly and sufficiently set forth in drawings when first

brought to the Chief of the Bureau, as set forth in finding II.

"V. The defendants were in the undisturbed use of the

claimant's invention from July 24, 1878, to July 24, 1884, by

attaching such registers to a great number of their presses.

During that period the claimant made no objection to such use of

his invention, and failed to give notice to the Secretary of the

Treasury or the Chief of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing

that he would demand royalty or remuneration therefor.

"VI. The average number of presses with claimant's device used

by the defendants between July 24, 1878, and July 24, 1884, was

200 per day, covering 1,802 working days."

Mr. W.W. DodgeandMr. A.A. Hoehling, Jr., for appellant:

There were parties competent to contract and there was proper subject matter for contract. Under § 2, act of July 11, 1862,12 Stat. 532; § 3577, Rev. Stat., the Secretary of thePage 232Treasury had full authority to act through agents or subordinate officers, as indeed the various executive officers must do in such matters from the very nature of the case. The findings of the court below show that the Secretary approved the form of register and directed that such registers be made and attached to the presses in the Bureau.

Thus it appears that this was the immediate and direct act of the Secretary of the Treasury in his official capacity, and with full knowledge of claimant's rights in the premises and within his statutory powers.

Before appellant consented to show his device to the Secretary, and again after he had so shown it (under an assurance of protection), but before consenting to the use of the registers, appellant demanded protection, and declared that he wanted first to secure his patent. Not until protection was a second time promised did he assent to use of his invention. Since then the United States has constructed and used continuously from the date of appellant's patent, the device so patented to him, and was, throughout the entire period covered by this claim, in the undisturbed use of his invention.

A party is not under obligation to renew or repeat notice of his rights. The patent is itself notice to all the world. The rule is the same as in a suit based upon infringement of a patent, instead of upon an implied license to use the patent.Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co. v.Brown, 114 F. 939, 944;Sessionsv.Romadka,145 U.S. 29.

There is no pretense of lack of knowledge of appellant's rights, or of lack of notice from him and demand for protection and the protection demanded was against the use of his invention without compensation by the Government and not protection against private parties.

The law implies compensation for property taken to the use of the Government, just as it does in the case of property taken or used by an individual without specific agreement as to compensation. 2 Blackstone, 443;United Statesv.Burns, 12 Wall. 246;Carmmeyerv.Newton,94 U.S. 225; § 22, PatentPage 233Act, now § 4884, Rev. Stat.;United Statesv.McKeever, 14 C. Cl. 396, aff'd by this court without opinion. See 14 Brodix's Pat. Cas. 414, 437;Jamesv.Campbell,104 U.S. 356;UnitedStatesv.Great Falls Mfg. Co.,112 U.S. 645;Great FallsMfg. Co. v.United States,124 U.S. 581;Hollisterv.B.B. Mfg. Co.,113 U.S. 59;United Statesv.Palmer,128 U.S. 262;United Statesv.Fire Arms Co.,156 U.S. 552;UnitedStatesv.Lynah,188 U.S. 445;Russellv.United States,182 U.S. 516.

If a demand for compensation was not made in terms, appellant was by coercion prevented from so making it. The command of a superior to an inferior may amount to coercion. 3 Wn. C.C. 209, 220; 12 Metc. (Mass.) 56; 1 Blatch. C.C. 549; 13 How. 115.

The command of a master to his servant or a principal to his agent may amount to coercion.13 Mo. 246;13 Mo. 137,340; 3 Cush. (Mass.) 279; 11 Metc. (Mass.) 66;5 Miss. 304;14 Ala. 365;22 Vt. 32; 2 Den. (N.Y.) 341; 14 Johns (N.Y.), 119.

A party who fails to make direct demand under such coercion is no more to lose his right to compensation than is he bound to perform a contract procured under like coercion.

That claimant was in Government employ does not alter the case.Solomonsv.United States,137 U.S. 342;Gillv.United States,160 U.S. 426.

Inventing or devising such a register was no part of appellant's duty. He was not assigned to such duty. He did it wholly out of working hours; at his own home; at his own expense, and patented it at his own expense.

The facts found bring the case clearly within the doctrine of the cases cited. The cases relied upon by defendant, and the cases cited by the court below, do not sustain the decision rendered herein.McClurgv.Kingsland, 1 How. 202;Pitcherv.United States, 1 C. Cl. 7;Solomonsv.United States,137 U.S. 342;McAleerv.United States,150 U.S. 424;LaneBodley Co. v.Locke,150 U.S. 193;Schillingerv.UnitedStates,155 U.S. 163;Keyesv.Eureka Mining Co.,158 U.S. 150;Page 234Keltonv.United States, 32 C. Cl. 314;Gillv.UnitedStates,160 U.S. 426,437, can all be distinguished.Mr. Special Attorney Charles C. Binney, with whomMr.Assistant Attorney General Pradtwas on the brief, for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question in the case is whether, on these facts, a contract arose between the United States and the appellant, whereby the United States promised to pay him for the use of his device.

We held inRussellv.United States,182 U.S. 516,530, that in order to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction, under the act of March 3, 1887,24 Stat. 505, c. 359, defining claims of which the Court of Claims had jurisdiction, the demand sued on must be founded on "a convention between the parties — `a coming together of minds.'" And we excluded, as not meeting this condition, those contracts or obligations that the law is said to imply from a tort.Schillingerv.United States,155 U.S. 163;United Statesv.Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co.,156 U.S. 552.

In the case at bar the Court of Claims finds that the appellant "supposed and understood that he would be entitled to compensation, and that it would be allowed and paid by the Secretary of the Treasury;" but it also finds that "on the part of the Secretary and Chief of Bureau (Engraving and Printing) it was supposed and understood that the claimant (appellant) being an employe of the Treasury Department would neither expect nor demand remuneration." That there was "a coming together of minds" is therefore excluded by the findings. And the use of the device cannot give a right independent of the understanding under which it was used. The appellant should have been explicit in his demand. He contendsPage 235that he was, but manifestly he was not, or the curious opposition between his expectation and that of the Secretary of the Treasury and Chief of Bureau could not have occurred. And we cannot assent to the suggestion that he "was by coercion prevented" from making a demand "in terms" by his subordinate position. How long must we suppose such coercion lasted and that he could have permitted a misunderstanding of his purpose? Six years passed, and the Chief of Bureau with whom the negotiations were made went out of office; another succeeded. No demand was made of either for compensation. Further time passed, and other Chiefs of Bureau succeeded. There was a succession of Secretaries of the Treasury; no demand was made of any of them. His first demand was the petition in this case, over fourteen years from his first interview with the Secretary of the Treasury. This delay cannot be overlooked or interpreted favorably to appellant's contention. He sues for $102,600, and this does not include the royalties that he contends he was entitled to for the first six years the device was used. He claims a royalty of twenty-five cents a day on an average of two hundred machines — that is, $50 a day. He was an employe of the Government at a modest salary, and we cannot conceive there was no inducement in $50 a day to an explicit demand of his rights, or that he was willing to wait, or felt himself coerced to wait, for their realization for fourteen years, and even to lose compensation for six years by the operation of the statute of limitations. The rights of the Government are obvious. The contention of the appellant forces on it a liability that it might not have taken. It was given no election of the terms upon which it would use the register, or whether it would use it at all. Of course, this argument is based on the fact that there was no coming together of the minds of the parties, or, as expressed by the findings of the Court of Claims, that "it was supposed and understood" by the officers of the Government that appellant "would neither expect nor demand remuneration." And this fact distinguishes the case fromMcKeeverPage 236v.United States, 14 C. Cl. 396, affirmed by this court; also fromUnited Statesv.Lynah,188 U.S. 445, and the other cases cited by appellant.Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissents.